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INTRODUCTION
Seventeenth-century England, characterized by a
struggle for ascendancy among manifold ideological forces,
is analogous to the present world, seemingly marked by a
conflict among democracy, totalitarianism, and their var
ious deviations.

Today, however, the doctrine of force is

often cunningly disguised under scores of seductive ap
pellations, whereas in the seventeenth century this doc
trine was more readily visible.

It is remarkable, there

fore, that the ghost of a man who terrorized certain in
habitants of that past century still haunts the scholars
of today, for at the present time at least a score of pol
itical theorists and philosophers are arguing over what
Thomas Hobbes really meant.

Hobbes, a cynical old det'er-

minist, has outlived his pious contemporaries.

It is per

haps also remarkable that a majority of the participants
are from Hobbes’s own homeland, a country from which, at
one time, Hobbes was forced to flee for his very. life.
The intellectual polemics concerning the political
philosophy of Hobbes are the results of seemingly insoluble
differences ,among the various schools of interpretation.
From their first appearance Hobbes’s writings were inter
preted in a relatively consistent manner.

Since 1936,

however, there has arisen a variety of new interpretations
of his moral and political philosophy.
1

These departures
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from the norm have been greeted by skepticism on the part
of those who endorse the traditional interpretation.

Skep

ticism is rarely welcomed, and so the innovators in turn
have been forced to strengthen their own positions.
This thesis is an attempt to examine the various
interpretations and the controversies that have resulted
from them by analyzing the works of representative au
thors of these approaches.

Only representative writings

have been utilized, for an examination of everything'
that has been written on Hobbes would be a task of im
mense magnitude.

It is necessary, however, to consider

the philosopher in question before examining the various
explications.
Hobbes’s experiences during his lifetime made a
definite impression on his theories, for his life was
unusual.

Hobbes and fear were born twins, and it seems

that fear plagued him the rest of his life.

Upon hear

ing rumors of the Spanish Armada, Hobbes's mother, a sim
ple woman of yeoman stock, apparently thought that Ma l 
mesbury, where she and her husband were then residing,
would be the natural objective of the invading force.
The result was the premature birth of her son, Thomas,
on April 5, 15$$*^ Not long after Thomas's birth, his
father, a semi-literate Anglican vicar, was forced to
■^■Sir Leslie Stephen, Hobbes{"English Men of Let
ters"'; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1904), 3«
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flee into obscurity for striking a fellow parson at the
church door at Westport.

Fortunately for the Hobbes child

ren they ha d a prosperous, childless uncle who assumed charge
of the deserted family.

At the age of four Hobbes was sent

to a church school where he learned to read and write.

When

he became proficient in these tasks, he was enrolled in a
Latin, school in Malmesbury.

Because he was a precocious

youngster, Hobbes entered Magdalen Hall, Oxford, at the age
of fifteen.

Magdalen Hall was at that time dominated by

Puritanism.

Hobbes left Oxford in 160$, thoroughly convinced

that it was intellectually sterile.

This feeling of contempt

probably stemmed from two factors: firstly, Hobbes was not a
good formal student, and secondly, Oxford was perhaps in' an
intellectual ebb.

In any event, upon graduation, Hobbes be

came a tutor to young William Cavendish, later to become the
second Earl of Devonshire.

In 1610, Hobbes and his young

pupil made a grand tour of Europe, concentrating on Italy
and France.

Upon returning to England, Hobbes spent the next

eighteen years with the Cavendish family, reading the works
of poets and historians.

It was at this time that he became

acquainted with Thucydides, a writer who greatly influenced
Hobbes’s thought.

Hobbes, by virtue of his-position, was al

so able to associate with the great and near-great men of
England.

In 162$ the second Earl died, leaving a frugal

widow who promptly curtailed expenses and dismissed Hobbes.
Hobbes, forced to seek other means of support, obtained a
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position as traveling tutor to the son of Sir Gervase Clin
ton.
tour.

For the second time Hobbes and a pupil went on a grand
This time they stayed in France, and Hobbes entered

French intellectual circles.

It was also at this point that

he was introduced to Euclid’s geometry.

He was so amazed

with Euclid that thenceforth he conceived philosophy from
the scientific and mathematical side.^

In 1631 he was in

vited to return from Paris to tutor the third Earl of Devon
shire, a boy about fourteen years of age.

Two years later,

Hobbes went on his third grand tour of the continent.

On

this visit he met Galileo, who was living near Florence as
a prisoner of the inquisition.

After leaving Florence,

Hobbes journeyed to Paris where he met Mersenne, a scientist
whom he instantly admired.

The third tour ended in 1637,

and by this time Hobbes was becoming well known.

Hobbes’s

future was slowly being shaped.
Meanwhile, the political situation in England was
becoming more unstable.

Parliament was in its eighth year

of suspension, and in the North the Scots were becoming
troublesome.

In 1640, when Charles was forced to appeal

to parliament, Hobbes began his literary career.

He wrote

a small p a m p h l e t , A Short Tract on First Principles, in
which he declared that sovereignty was vested in the crown.
Hobbes felt that the Long Parliament might find time to
I

------------------- ------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------- ;__________ :________________ __________________________________________________

1Ibid., 19.
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deal with the author of this little treatise, so he fled to
France, where he spent the next eleven years.

The result of

his growing interest in the civil war was De Give, finished
in 1642.

Apparently it was only intended for a few European

scholars, for it was printed in Latin, and only a small num
ber of copies were distributed.

During this time he also

wrote Elements of Law which, however, was not published in
England until I65O.

With De Cive out of the way, Hobbes

began to compose the Leviathan, his major work.

His writing

was interrupted, however, when he was appointed mathematical
tutor to the Prince of Wales, then an exile in Paris*

In

the middle of I65 I. the Leviathan was finished, and was
promptly published in English.-*-

Doubtlessly, the Leviathan

was intended for English readers.
When Charles II reached Paris after his defeat at
Worcester, Hobbes, with all good intentions, presented him
with a manuscript copy of the Leviathan.

Unfortunately for

Hobbes his book was not well received in the royal circles,
so he was forced to retreat to England*^

Three months later

Hobbes walked to an Anglican chapel and took the sacraments.
He also made*his submission to the Council of State. There^All references to the Leviathan in this thesis
will be to: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946)*
^Stephen, o p . cit., 41®
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after, Hobbes remained in England.

In 1653 Hobbes once

again became a member of the Cavendish family, spending most
of his time reading and writing in their small house, in Lon
don.

When Charles II returned to England, Hobbes arrived at

the court and swore his allegiance.
Hobbes's ability as a polemicist was by this time
firmly established, and he seemed to plunge into one contro
versy after another.

The old gentleman made the mistake of

saying that he had squared the circle, whereupon he was promp
tly "torn apart” by John Wallis, a mathematics professor at
Oxford.

Hobbes's prior denunciation of Oxford perhaps served

to increase Wallis's vigor.

In any event, Wallis remained

Hobbes’s most formidable opponent for the rest of his life.
The great plague of London occurred in 1665, and was followed
the next year by the great fire.

The great fire might be

excused as being caused by the Papists, but surely they could
never have been responsible for the plague.

To the English

this was undoubtedly a manifestation of divine wrath; and
the most.satisfactory way of appeasement would be to rid the
country of atheists.

Hobbes began to worry when a bill was

brought into Parliament for the suppression of atheism and
profanity, and a committee was instructed to seek information
concerning the Leviathan.
' " l_" ■"1 -t ■

Some of the bishops even made a

motion to have the old fellow burned at the stake.
vor, however, was only short-lived.

The fer

But in any event, Hobbes

went to church more regularly from that time on.

In 166$

7
Hobbes, by this time in his eightieth year, published the
Behemoth.
II.

However, its publication was suppressed by Charles

Even at eighty, Hobbes was still taking an active part

in the controversies he had fostered.

After a few years

Hobbes retired from taking part in intellectual disputations
to a new type of occupation -- translating.

In 1673 he pub

lished a translation of the Voyage of Ulysses, followed a
year later by complete translations of the Iliad and the
Odyssey.

It is remarkable that so old a man could translate

such difficult text.

Two years later Hobbes left London and

moved, to the Cavendish country homes at Chatsworth and
Hardwick.

On December 4, 1679, he died T,...glad to find a

hole to creep out of the world at.nl
Hobbes's entire life, then, was one of the mind; it
was dedicated to the regime of thought.

Outside of the intel

lectual field his life was essentially placid.

In analyzing

Hobbes’s life one must remember that Hobbes was supported
during its entirety by the English aristocracy.

Consequently

he could be an innocent bystander at the political events of
his time.

He owed no real allegiance to any faction in

English politics, a factor that must be considered in interpreting the Leviathan.

And, fortunately for Hobbes as a pol

itical theorist, he lived in one of the most violent and ex
citing periods of English history.

g
As Hobbes did little formal reading, he could view
events with a fresh eye, for he was not bound by the theories
of the past.

This lack of respect for tradition was perhaps

valuable for Hobbes, who was trying to substitute a new scheme
of thought, built upon entirely new foundations.
Hobbes’s experiences abroad also put a definite stamp
on his thinking.

In all, he spent about seventeen years on

the continent, broken into four visits.
ed something new.

On each visit he learn

The first made him aware that the Aristotel-

ianism then taught in England was everywhere else *being aban
doned.

It also sent him back to the study of classical lan

guages and their non-philosophical literature.1

On the sec

ond trip he looked into a copy of Euclid's geometry and was
so impressed by what he saw there that he used it as a basis
for a system that would cover the whole spectrum of rational
knowledge.^

On the third visit he began the study of natural

philosophy, particularly under the influence of the scientist,
Mersenne.

By the time of his last visit, the result of vol

untary exile, he was recognized by the great philosophers of
France, a factor that contributed to his intellectual conceit.
Hobbes impressed English thought, then, almost en
tirely by vigorous opposition, for the Leviathan was perhaps
the*most un-English book ever written on the state by an
^T. E. Jessop, Thomas Hobbes. No. 130("Writers and
their Work"; London: Longmans, Green, I960), 10.
2Ibid.. 11.
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Englishman*1

It contradicted almost all the English ortho-

doxies in politics, morals and religion.

Because he was so

unorthodox, the reaction of Hobbes's contemporaries was bel
licose.

John Watkins characterized the attitude of these

critics in the following paragraphs
What was new and unheard-of to_.Hobbes’s
contemporaries in De Give and the Leviathan
was their sheer monstrousness.
Angry bishops
and royalists and Presbyterians did not com
plain about Hobbes’s heavy emphasis on author
ity in which they were staunch believers them
selves. Where he had gone shockingly wrong in
their eyes was in conceiving authority, not as
something remote and august and touched by God,
but as a bureaucratic engine of civil order
built to the specifications of nakedly selfish
human beings.
They feared his ideas not be
cause they were authoritarian, but because they
were subversive of extra-human authority.
As time passed, however, the reaction became less
bitter, and Hobbes was not without his advocates.

The first

was Spinoza, who adopted a considerable portion of Hobbes’s
political philosophy.

In the eighteenth century Rousseau

took Hobbes’s view of law and transmuted it into his theory
of the general will.

Even Marx was familiar with Hobbes’s

philosophy, having met it in Holbach.

Europeans were not

the only ones who endorsed Hobbes’s ideas, however, for here
in America he had his disciples.

Daniel Leonard used Hobbes’s

theories- to support Great Britain in the Revolution.1
1Ibid., 17.
W. N. Watkins, "The Posthumous Career of Thomas
Hobbes," Review of Politics. XIX(1957), 352.
^Ibid., 354 et passim.
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Alexander Hamilton was also a Hobbesian in his concept of
government.

He favored an all-powerful presidency, and

even after he became the Secretary of the Treasury he con
tinued to insist on security and order as the primary func
tions of the state.
It is difficult to explain why Hobbes has always
held the interest of political theorists and other scholars,
alike.

Perhaps they are attracted to his writings because

of their iconoclasm.

Or perchance his harsh view of man

and his denial of any transcendent good draw their attention.
In any event, if a theorist may be judged by the duration of
his effect, then Hobbes must be classified as a theorist of
the first order.

CHAPTER I
THE TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION
The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, as mani
fested in the Leviathan, has occasioned the rise of a stand
ard interpretation that is commonly accepted as being correct.
This interpretation owes its origins primarily to Hobbes’s
contemporary critics, that is, it issued from Hobbes’s theo
ries as those .theories impressed themselves on the minds of
these contemporaries.

The propagation and augmentation of

this exegesis have been accomplished by various scholars of
the subsequent centuries.
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine this
interpretation of Hobbes’s theory by discussing the opinions
of those seventeenth-century critics and the scholars of
later years who are representative of this tradition.
Although these various savants have many differences, as
the reader will easily note, the common thread which.runs
through each opinion is sufficient to bind it to the tradi
tional interpretation.
John Bowie, an Oxford scholar, ably discusses the
opinions of certain contemporary censurers of Hobbes in his
work entitled Hobbes and His Critics.

These men, for the

I-John Edward Bowie, Hobbes and His Critics(New York:
Oxford University Press, 1952). John Bowie, an astute histo-
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most part, were prominent and learned, and so their crit
icisms of Hobbes have been well-respected throughout the
years„

For the purposes of this survey, however, each crit

ic will not be discussed in detail, instead only certain of
their opinions will be considered.

Bowie divides the crit

icisms into four main categories.^

Firstly, he contends,

all agree that Hobbes’s materialism is confounded by nat
ural law.

One will recall that the basis of Hobbes’s pol

itical theory is a radical materialism, a crude behaviorist
outlook that regards matter and motion alone as real..

Hen

ce the metaphysical and religious sanctions of traditional
political thought are only pretence to Hobbes.

2

Like Marx,

he claimed to give a ’scientific* ex
planation of human behavior, which he re
garded as determined by reflex actions,
and to provide a political theory which
was based on conduct so determined.3
This concept of a materialist basis of society, however,
only served to antagonize the critics of Hobbes’s age, be
cause for them society and government were sanctioned by
a mystical order.

John Whitehall states, ’’what stuff this

rian,. was born in England in 1905» He obtained his education
from Balliol College, Oxford, where he was a Brackenbury
Scholar in 1924« He entered the teaching profession as a
lecturer in modern history at Wadham College, Oxford. In
1950 he was promoted to a professorship of political theory.
His publications are numerous, including Western Political
Thought. and The Unity of European History. Who* s Who (~London: Adam and Charles Black, I960), 322.
■^Bowle, op. cit., 186.

% b i d .. 44«
3lbid.
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is to ground any government upon...It is as full of damnable
opinions as a toad is of p o i s o n , I n Lord Clarendon* s op
inion Hobbes’s state would not stand, for it would command
no "awful veneration."

2

Philip Hunton regards sovereignty

as an "indivisible beam of divine protection/’ since it refleets a cosmic order*/
The faith of the critics in the
%
traditional laws of nature is illustrated by Archbishop
John Bramhall’s attack on Hobbes for his "gross mistake of
the Laws of Nature,.,A moral Heathen would blush for shame
to see such a catalogue of the Laws of Nature."^
Ibid,, 191. John Whitehall was perhaps the least
high-minded of all the contemporary critics of Hobbes, An
attorney educated in the Inner Temple, he supported the
supremacy of law and property. Although a royalist, his at
tack on Hobbes was from the viewpoint of a constitutional1 st, Ibid,? 35-38.

2

Ibid, Edward Hyde, better known as the first Earl
of Clarendon., was born in 1609 and died in 1674, He was ed
ucated at Magdalen Hall, Oxford, from which he received a
Bachelor of Arts degree in 1 6 2 6 , A man who held great pres
tige, he favored the establishment of a constitutional mon
archy, Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. X, ed, Sidney
Lee(Londons Smith, Elder and C o. , 1 9 0 8 7 V 370-389,
3Bowiej op. cit., I8 9 . Philip Hunton was born in
1604 and died in" 1 6 8 2 .”” A scholarly critic, he received a
Master of Arts degree from Wadham College, Oxford, in.l629»
In I 65I he was appointed Master of Cromwell’s Northern Uni
versity at Durham. Hunton®s sympathy for a limited monarchy
was illustrated in his work, A Treatise of Monarchy, pub
lished in 1643o Dictionary of~National Biography„ Vol. X,
312-333 o
^Bowle, op. cit., 189.
John Bramhall, Archbishop
of A rmagh, was born in 1594 and died in I6 6 3 . He received
his education from Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, from
which he received four degrees, the highest being a Doctor
of Divinity.
His thesis was strongly anti-papal.
During
the Civil War he supported the royalist cause. Dictionary
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Secondlys contends Bowie, all are adverse to Hobbes’s
cynical and deterministic view of human nature0

They refuse

to regard man as a cog in a mechanistic universe„

Sir Robert

Filmer asserts that Hobbes’s state of nature could never have
occurred among the ’’descendants of •Adam/’ for ”God was no
1
such niggard at the creation0”

Bramhall contends that the

Hobbesian man was non-existent<, for "there was never such
degenerate rabble in the world that were without all religions
all government, all laws* natural and civile”

The Reverend

John Eachard is representative of the critics when he main
tains that human nature is not so "vile" or "raskally" as
Hobbes supposed it to be„^
Thirdlys these various Englishmen are opposed to the
Hobbesian allegation that nothing is morally right or wrong
until the sovereign commands or forbids i t s and in consequ
ence there is no standard by which the ruler may himself be
judgedo

Whitehall feels that

of National Biography, Vol„ I I 9 ed„ Sir Leslie Stephen and
Sidney Lee* llll-1114o
•^Bowle, o p 0 cito,, l 6 0 Sir Robert Filmer was born
in 1§03 and died~in 1653 °
Hewas a royalists an astute
scholarj and a country gentleman of an independent mind„
Filmer favored patriarchal absolutism,, and is perhaps
best known to posterity for his Patriarcha, a defense
of monarchy,, which Locke so ably ridiculedo
Ibido, 1 5 o
2Ib id o, 124o
■^John Eachard, a great wit and humorist, was born
in 1636 and died in lo97«
In 1675 he became Master of S t »
Catherine’s Hall at Cambridges and in 1679 vice-chancellor
of the University,, Eachard possessed a great knack for col
loquial satirej as is shown in his books Mr„ Hobbes’s State
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if all religion and morality have no
sanction but fear and the ruler's command,
the ’vilest Indian superstitions’ rank
with civilized religion. But just as the
scripture would have been valid without
the Churchj so natural law is independentof institutions
Clarendon contends that the killing of innocent subjects
by Hobbes’s sovereign* which he has a moral right to do,,
would violate natural law and injure God.

As Bowie avers*

”all were provoked to assert the moral basis of society* its
p
ultimate authority over and distinction from government
Lastly,, the critics agree unanimously that Hobbes’s
system of government is impractical.

’’Hobbes

declares

Bramhallj ’’labours under a hopeless disadvantage; he has
no idea of practical polities.”3

Clarendon perhaps epito

mizes the views of the critics when he states;
It is a very hard matter for an archi= ,
tect in state and policy* who doth despise
all precedent* and will not observe any
rules of practice* to make such a model of
government as will be in any degree pleas
ant to the governor or the ^governed* or
secure for either..^

V

Bowie’s personal interpretation of Hobbes’s pol
itical doctrine will suffice for a summary of the above
of Nature Considered in a Dialogue between Philautus and
Timothyo Dictionary of National Biography. Vol. VI* 302=303»
Bowie9 op. cit. . 1780
2Ibid., 199.
^Ibid.9 200.
^Ibido
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views, for their opinions are mirrored in his thoughts.
This Oxford scholar believes that Hobbes attempted to pro*vide a materialistics egotistical underpinning for a new
political theory. based on the supposition that the conduct
of men can be determined by observation of their reflex
actions in a mechanistic world,,

The goal of the Hobbesian

state is the promotion of individual felicity,, which arises
out of greed and egoismc

The state must be an authorita

rian conciliator of selfish interestss for only when life
is ordered can individual felicity in any degree by ob
In regard to Hobbesfs religious views s Bowie feels

tained.

that if Hobbes was not an atheist P he was at the least an
agnostic.

Bowie8s feelings about Hobbes are summarized

very adroitly in the following statement;
He is the prophet of a cynieal8 deter
ministic and utilitarian political theory8
which discards the old sanctions?of natural
reason reflecting a Divine order9 and which
replaces it with the imposition of arbitrary
power as the price of security. He repudi
ates the alternative--the standard by which
governments as distinct from society, is to
be judged.
He attempts to destroy the con
cepts both of a constitutional frame of
society superior to executive government
and of a cosmic order superior to man-made
institutions...and by advocating the subor
dination of religion to political authority,,
and his dislike of corporations within the
commonwealthj he paved the way for modern
utilitarianism,, concepts of positive law, ' .1
and concentrated state power.^
The outlines of the standard interpretation having
-klbid.. 560
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been drawn by Hobbes’s contemporaries, it is now necessary
to discuss the various writers who have filled in and aug
mented the above sketcho

Sir Leslie Stephen is perhaps

characteristic of these writers.,^

His book, published in
2
1904, is still widely cited by contemporary scholars„
Stephen divides his work into two main parts; a biography
of Hobbes; and a discussion of Hobbes’s view of.the world,
man, and the state„

However, since this paper is concerned

primarily with Hobbes’s political philosophy, Stephen’s
treatment of this matter will be more heavily emphasizedo
Before Stephen’s exposition of the Hobbesian state
is discussed, however, it is necessary to comment briefly
^Sir Leslie Stephen, a man of letters and a phil
osopher, was born in l#32o His higher education consisted
of a short attendance at Kings College, and four years at
Trinity Hall at Michaelmas, Cambridge„ From Cambridge he
received a Goodbehere Fellowship,, In IG56 he obtained a
junior tutorship at Trinity Hall, and three years later he
took religious orders„ However, after reading Mill, Comte,
and Kant, he rejected the historical evidences of Christi
anity o Thus he was forced to resign his tutorship, which
was contingent upon his being a priest„ At the end of IG64
Stephen left Cambridge for London in order to embark on a
literary career., Early in IS65 he relinquished his relig
ious orders0
For the remainder of his life Stephen pursued a '
career of writing and working as an editor of various/ maga
zines o Religious and philosophical speculations also held
his interest, however, and in IS76 he composed a two volume
History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century„ Six
years later he produced his Science of Ethics, in which he
summed up his views of the fundamental problems of life’,',
in light of his study of Mill, Darwin, and Spencer0 During
the-same year he also assumed the editorship of the Dic
tionary of National Biography, a position he was to hold
for nine years„ In 1904 Stephen died*
Dictionary of Nat
ional Biography, 2nd Supple, Vole III, e d c Sidney Lee, 39#“
405 e
^Sir Leslie Stephen, Hobbes(’’English Men of Letters” ;
New York; The Macmillan Co 0,*190477

on his interpretation of Hobbes’s philosophical system.

Thi

Cambridge alumnus feels that Hobbes was attempting to corn?
struct a complete system in which the method of the physical
sciences would be coordinated with a theory of the civil
state, i.e., Hobbes wanted to expound a mechanical theory of
the universe where every phenomenon would be explained as
the effect of known causes, and where motion and matter are
the two universal actualities, by which even man may be ex
plained.

Stephen, in describing the Hobbesian man, declares

’’man is an automation; thought is a motion in his brain; and
all his actions can be explained by the laws of motion, like
the motions of a clock.”-1- His perceptions, calculations,
and motives are movements in his brain, caused by the impact of external bodies on the organs of the senses.

Here

one finds a mechanistic explanation of physiological enti-j
ties.

Stephen notes a break in the continuity of method

when Hobbes discusses human nature, for he contends, that
although Hobbes still attempts to use his theory of motion,
he.is forced to rely on empirical psychology.

However, as

this particular topic is not of great importance to this
thesis, it will suffice at this time to explain Stephen’s
elaboration of the social characteristics of the Hobbesian
man.
■'■Ibid., &ko
2Ibid., 104o
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Stephen’s opinion of the Hob'besian man can best be
illustrated by his description of the Hobbesian state of
nature,,

In this condition all men possess two characteris

tics in common; they are naturally equal; and all seek pow
er over otherso

The results of this equality and desire

for power are obvious; there will be war by all against alio
Stephen deviates somewhat from the opinion of Hobbes’s con
temporaries when he states that Hobbes did not imply that
men are evil by nature,

’’The desires are not themselves

wicked,” Stephen states, ’’although at times they may cause
wicked actions0”^

The Cambridge scholar advances this con

tention a step further when he asserts;
A modern world would maintain, like
Hobbes, that in admitting the part played
by selfish force in the development of so-,
ciety, he does not assert the wickedness
of human nature. He only asserts that the
good impulses cannot acquire the desirable
supremacy until a peaceful order has been
established by the complex struggles and
alliances of human beings, swayed by all
their passions and ambitions
Men get out of this degenerate state by using their
reason to discover the laws of nature.

The laws of nature,

however, Stephen believes, are not properly laws but rather
theorems of what are conducive to self-preservation, ’’The
Law of Nature, we see, is simply an application of the pure
ly egotistic law of self-preservation,,”^

1Ibido» l$5o
2Ibid„0 186.
3lbid.„ 189.

These theorems be-
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come laws as binding commands when they are delivered in
the word of God.

They are always binding in foro interno;

you are always bound to desire that they should came:' into
operation, because they are conducive to self-preservation,
•They are not always binding in foro externo, however; you
are not obliged to put them into practice, for to do so in
the state of nature would be a hindrance to individual
self-preservation,
Stephen asserts that Hobbes realized
that the development of morality
implies the growth of a certain under
standing between the individuals com
posing the society, and that until this
has been reached ideal morality proper
to a higher plane of thought is imprac
ticable if not undesirable,1
• Apparently, Stephen is suggesting the absence of
any type of morality outside of political society.

As for

the question of morality in civil society, Stephen is in
essential agreement with Bowie that government creates moral
values,

Stephen believes that Hobbes identifies law and

morality.

He himself feels that the actual morality of a

race is evolved in constant correlation with its social
organization.2

Stephen avers,

Hobbes, who substituted the social
contract for this process, and regarded
sovereignty as the sole bond of union,
could only approximate to this, doctrine

4 M cL , 191.
2Ibid,. 216 ,
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by making moral obligations a product of
the sovereign will.l
But Hobbes contends that the sovereign creates morality by
making honesty and gratitude, which are precepts of the law
of nature tending toward self-preservation, obligatory,.
But the problem arises, what if the sovereign makes immoral
laws?

At this point Stephen begs this question by saying

that the sovereign cannot commit injustice or injury in the
proper signification,.

The subject has no right to protest

or disobey because of the immorality of the sovereign, the
reason being that the only alternative is anarchy.
laws are better than no laws.2

Bad

So ultimately Stephen is

put in the position of saying that the sovereign can make
any law that he desires, so long as he maintains order.
As

stated above, Stephen regards Hobbes’s laws of

nature as theorems conducive to self-preservation.

But

every man has a possible right to everything in the state
of nature, by virtue of the fact that this is necessary
for his individual felicity and self-preservation.

It is

evident that in a situation of this type no man’s life or
happiness is s e c u r e T h e r e f o r e the fundamental theorem
of nature is that every man should seek peace and then
maintain it, for peace nullifies the necessity for'selfllbid.
2Ibid.. 217c
3Ibid. . 187.
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defense.

Consequently, a man should lay down his right to

all things if others will do the same.

At this point Stephen

elaborates Hobbes’s definition of obligation, duty and jus
tice:
A man may simply renounce or he may
transfer a right. In either case, he is
said to be ’obliged’ not to interfere
with the exercise of a right by those to
whom he has abandoned or granted it. It
is his ’duty’ not to make his grant void
by hindering men from using the right;
and such hindrance is called ’injustice.’1
Stephen asserts that obligation in the Hobbesian
sense is obedience to the terms of a contract, whether it
is implicit or explicit.

Carrying this definition into

the civil state, one can discern that the Hobbesian man
must obey his sovereign because he has contracted to do
so.

The violation of the contract on the part of the sub

ject would create a breach of duty or injustice.

He pre

sumably has the right to breach the contract only if the
sovereign can no longer provide security, or in some way
endangers his physical being.

The subject is obliged to

ft

obey the law because he has contracted with his fellow sub
jects to do so, i.e., he and his fellow subjects have au
thorized the sovereign to legislate for them.
The final part of Stephen’s interpretation which
/
'
will be considered is th&t dealing with the relationship
, ft

between church and state. Stephen declares that Hobbes’s
*
essential position is quite simple. ( Since actions often
3-1 bid., 187.

stem from opinions, these opinions must be directed in or
der for actions to be controlled.1

Consequently the sover-

eign is bound to forbid the utterance or propagation of
opinions be which his authority may be subverted, regardless
of whether these opinions are uttered by a priest or a cit
izen.

But a more crucial question is involved here, for

the presence of an independent ecclesiastical authority
would split the sovereignty.

For- Hobbes, then,- the church,

as a law-making or governing body, must be fused with the
state.2

When discussing Hobbes’s atheism, Stephen advances

the following argument?
Hobbes declares that the only proof of....
God’s existence is the creation of the world,
and that we cannot possibly know whether the
world was or was not created. In any case,
as we have seen, Hobbes always asserts most
emphatically that we really know nothing of
God’s attributes, except his existence.-?
Stephen concludes by saying that it is sufficient to re
mark that Hobbes’s system would be more lucid if he sim
ply omitted any reference to theology.^
The next savant to b e 'considered is H. R. TrevorRoper, a professor of modern history at O x f o r d . ^
......... —

-

- ..........

■

Trevor-
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1Ib id ., 220.
2I b i d ., 223.
3lbid.. 151.
^Ibid.. 152.
5h. R. Trevor-Roper, "Fear as the Basis of Hobbes’s
Political Philosophy,” New Statesman and Nation, XXX(1945)s,
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Roper’s main thesis is that the basis of Hobbes’s political
philosophy is fear, that is, fear as related to the funda
mental law of self-preservation.

This Oxford professor al

leges that the Hobbesian man is ”by nature unpolitical and
irrational, a mechanical creature moved by strings and
springs, and driven by fear and emotions derived from fear.’’^
Man never moves toward positive ends except away from fear.
Trevor-Roper contends that Hobbes believes there are two
answers to this basic problem of mankind.
that exploits the fear of the unknown.

One is religion

Hobbes, however,

considered religion not as a safeguard against fear, but
rather as a parasite on it.

At this point Trevor-Roper

clings to the views of Hobbes’s contemporary censurers when
he asserts that Hobbes was a complete atheist, ’’regarding
all religion as a deliberate fraud invented by the priests
to fool the p e o p l e . T h e

other solution to the problem

is the Hobbesian civil state.

Trevor-Roper interprets

Hobbes as saying that man, to escape the consequences of
his bestial, yet timid nature, must erect a civil authority
6l. Hugh Redwall Trevor-Roper, born in 1914, is currently
a Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford. He obtain
ed his higher education from Charterhouse and Christ Church,
Oxford, from which he graduated with first class honors. In
1934 he became a Craven Scholar, and from 1937 to 1939 he
was a Research Fellow at Merton College. Seven years later
he was appointed a Student of Christ Church, Oxford.
He
has written several books, including, Archbishop Laud and
The Gentry; 1540-1640. W h o ’s W h o , 1959, 3065.
'
^Trevor-Roper, op. cit., 6l.
2Ibid.
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of terrifying completeness;
a state based upon naked, and wielding
power; whose effectiveness alone- is his leg
itimacy, whose opinions are truth; whose or
ders are justice, resistence to which is a
logical absurdity,!
This particular author summarizes very adroitly when he
maintains the Leviathan was written with its axiom: fear;
its method: logic; and its conslusion: despotism,2

As

the reader will easily perceive, the position of Trevor•j*
Roper is quite similar to Bowlejs interpretation of Hobbes,
It is unusual to find the interpretation of two men so alike.
The next interpretation is that of'John Plamenatz.^
Plamenatz devotes a short section of his book, The English
Utilitarians, to Hobbes, and although his interpretation
does not coincide precisely with the others in this tra
dition, it has sufficient similarity to be classified in
this same category,^

This expositor contends that Hobbes

had very little respect for the past and its traditions,
for he discarded both of the prevalent European moral the
ories, of his time.

One of these theories asserted that the

supreme object of human endeavor was; the full and harmonious
V

.

.

.

^Ibid,
^Ibid,
•^At present Mr, Plamenatz is an instructor at Nuf
field College, Oxford,
^■John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians(2nd Ed,;:
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).

development of all powers of the individual; while the other
contended that virtue consists of behavior in accord with
rules that
cording

man can discern by the use of his reason.

Ac

to Hobbes’s system no man can be better or worse

than he was before; he can only be more or less successful
in acquiring felicity.

The laws of morality, according to

Hobbes, are merely rules which men would do well to obey
if they wish to be happy.

2

These rules are only dictates

for attaining felicity, and as such they are not morally
binding upon anyone.

Plamenatz asserts that

the state is no more than a contrivance
to insure that all men do obey these rules,
so that it may be in the interest of each of
them to do so.For a man who obeys them,
~
while others do not, is no better than a fool.
Hobbes denies that virtue, which is obedience to moral
laws, has a value for men independent of its power to
promote their happiness.

The state, then, is a means of

reconciling the selfish interests of men.

It exists in

order that the individual may have greater felicity, and
not to protect his natural rights.
defines

natural rights

that aright in

At this point Plamenatz

in the Hobbesian sense, by asserting

the state of nature is an unlimited power

to acquire whatever a person desires, providing that he
1I M d . , 11,
2Ibid.
^Ibidl
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has sufficient strength*

For Hobbes, rights are merely pow

er, but he treats them as if they were what others mean by
natural rights*

Here Plamenatz veers from the other scho

lars of the traditional approach when he contends that Hob
bes’s transfer of right from the subject to the sovereign
is alien to the main body of his doctrine.

He feels this

is not compatible with Hobbes’s premises in which the sov
ereign can do no wrong, for
if a subject finds it in his interest
to obey the laws, while the sovereign can
often afford, when it suits his purpose, to
ignore them, this is only because the sub
ject has little power and the sovereign a
great deal.^
No covenant can create obligations in the parties to it,
for all a covenant can do is alter the circumstances in
which men act.

The Hobbesian state is a system in which

it is the selfish interest of every man to oblige every
other man to behave in a way that suits his neighbors.
Hobbes's social contract does not impose real obligations
on the partners to it, for
his purpose is not to explain why and to
what extent subjects are obliged to obey their
rulers, but only to prove that it is, in all
but the most rare occasions, in their interest
to do so.
On examining the above interpretation, one can see
that Mr. Plamenatz agrees essentially with the other inter1Ibid., 13.
2Ibid., 14.

pretations on the question of morality in the Hobbesian
state.

He differs somewhat on the question of obligation,

but nevertheless he is still close to the traditional in
terpretation, because he bases obligations on self-interest,
which is implicit in the orthodox interpretation.
The most recent work, chronologically, in the
vein of the traditional interpretation is a short survey
of the political philosophy of Hobbes written by T. E.
Jessop for the British Council and Book L e a g u e J e s s o p ,
a student of Hume, is a Ferens Professor of Philosophy at
2
the University of Hull.
Regardless of his specialty,
however, he has surveyed Hobbes rather well.

Jessop as

serts that Hobbes drew the conclusion from t h e .miseries of
the civil wars that the dominating function of the state
is to secure peace, and the only possible way to carry
out this function is to have a government possessed of
3

plenary powers over all spheres, religious and civil alike.
The, theoretical.problem is set when Hobbes describes, man
^T. E. Jessop, Thomas Hobbes. No. 130( "Writers and
their Work"; Londons.Longmans, Green, i9 6 0 ).
O

Thomas Edmund Jessop, a distinguished scholar, was
born in 1$96. He was educated at Heckmondwike School, Leeds
University, and Oriel College, Oxford. Since I9 2 S he has
been the Ferens Professor of Philosophy in the University of
Hull. He has worked on the editorial board of the World
Methodist Council, and has also been the Chairman of the
Adult Religious Education sub-committee of the British Coun
cil of Churches. Jessop is a prolific writer, having com
posed many books. Several of these books are on Hume. Who's
W h o . 1959, 1603-1604.
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in the state of nature, i.e.,, being outside of a polit
ically organized society.

Here Jessop contends,

every one acts solely for himself,
dominated hy the passion for self-pres
ervation, 1. .and each, finding everybody
in these respects like himself, goes be
yond a merely passive to an active safe
guarding of what he has and gets - de
fense by antifipatory aggression.I
Jessop maintains Hobbes’s view of human nature is only a
hypothesis, the main support of which is his general psy
chology.

An egotistic view of human nature, then, is the

initial postualte of this psychology and not the argued
conclusion.

In any event Hobbes’s premises oblige him to

seek the cause and justification of the civil state in man’
very selfishness.

Intelligence and raw passion lead men

to seek peace and follow it.

Man is convinced by his

reason that peace- is more conducive to individual feli
city;.fear of violent death forces man to believe that life
will be longer in ordered society.

The result of this rea

soning is a social contract which will be self-enforcing.
Men transfer their rights to a sovereign and, in doing so,
they become completely subject to him.

Jessop feels that

the Hobbesian social contract was not intended to be an ex
planation of the historical origins of government, but rath
er it was used for logical purposes, i.e., Hobbes was ex
amining the notion of sovereignty as the one essential
- i

i- -

■^Ibid., 19.
2Ibid.

.

-
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facet of political philosophy.

One must remember that

Hobbes was a logician, par excellence.
and deducing was Hobbes's profession.

The art of defining
Despotism, however,

is a very old phenomenon, and so Hobbes's major contribution
to political theory was his juridically applicable con
ception of the nature of civil laws, i.e., Hobbes asserts
that..
a law is nothing more or less than the <;r
command of the sovereign, and is binding in
virtue of its origin, not its content.1
The practical implications of this theory, contends Jessop,
are frightful, for all external actions and institutions are
o
in every respect under the jurisdiction of the sovereign,
Hobbes reasons that if the sovereign does not have absolute
power there will be anarchy.

A price must be paid for or

der.
When discussing the question of morality in the
Hobbesian state, Jessop departs somewhat from the standard
interpretation.

He feels that Hobbes's sovereign is .bound

by both God and his conscience to be responsible for his
subjects. '..The author contends, however, that this refer
ence to ethics and morality is not inconsistent with Hobbes's
earlier views, for the Hobbesian man in a state of nature
had discovered by reqson the various rules of conduct that
one should follow.
1Ibid., 22.
2Ibid,

Jessop believes that Hobbes's man is
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moral in the sense that, "quite independently of political
discipline, he is aware of moral distinctions and impera
tives."^

Apparently Jessop feels that the Hobbesian laws

of nature are in some way moral axioms.

He further expands

this argument by saying that the laws of nature come from
the author of nature, who is undoubtedly God.

Consequent

ly these are laws for all eternity, binding on man as such,
and therefore on rulers and subjects alike.

Jessop ends

his survey by asserting that Hobbes’s ethic includes ob
jective moral laws which are perpetually valid and divine
in origin but which only become operative in a civil state.
As for Hobbes’s religious beliefs, Jessop maintains that
if Hobbes was an atheist, he was hypocritical;-but on the
other hand, he was a deist only if his reference to revel
ation was also hypocritical.

This philosophy professor

summarizes his survey with the following statements
...Hobbes.is adamant in proclaiming
peace as the paramount external condition
of a really human life, and strong govern
ment as the only means of securing it; and
believes that morality and religion are
demands of ma n ’s original nature, one of
his problems being how to reconcile their
inner automony with the necessity of com
prehensive political control.3
No-discussion of the>.traditional interpretation
would be complete without reference to the various text1Ibid., 2 5 .
2Ibid.
3Ib id .. 2 7 .
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book writersj for they, above everyone else, are responsible
for the propagation of this interpretation today.

Perhaps

the most satisfactory manner of discussing these writers
would be to choose an author representative of their thoug
hts.

For this purpose William Ebenstein is perhaps the

best choice, for he is illustrative of the text-book writers.^ . Ebensteints interpretation of the Hobbesian state of
nature epitomizes the accepted view of what is correct.

He

contends that the Hobbesian men ”are naturally equal in mind
2
and body.”
Furthermore, this basic equality of men. is the
principal source of trouble and misery, i.e., if two men
seek an object, they naturally become antagonistic and seek
to destroy each other.3

This professor also believes that

the Hobbesian social contract is for philosophical rather
than historical purposes.

The fear of death is the passion

that moves men toward peace, for once man realizes that his
fear of violent death is due primarily to brutal competition,
he will seek a system where this competition-will be elim-Nfilliam Ebenstein, Introduction to Political Philosophy(New York; Rhinehart and Co., 1952). Austrian-born,
W i l l i a m ,Ebenstein is currently a professor of political
science at Princeton University.
He is well educated, hav
ing received a Bachelor of Laws degree from the University
of Vienna, and a Doctor of Philosophy from the University of
Wisconsin. He has written several books including Fascist
Italy, Great Political Thinkers, and Modern Political Thought. Wh.oTs Who in America, Vol. XXXII(Chicago; A. N. Marquis
Co., 1962-1 9 6 3 ), $37.
p
Ebenstein, op. cit., 12J+.
3Ibid.
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inated to a degree,

Ebenstein concludes his discussion of

Hobbes’s social contract by asserting that it is unlike any
other social contract theory that preceded it, for it is
between the subjects themselves, the sovereign having no
part in it.

Endorsing the official interpretation, he con

cludes that since the sovereign power is "incommunicable
and inseparable,” every corporation, including the churches,
must be subordinated 'to the state.^

The state must de

termine the doctrine of the church if the church is not to
interfere with the basic function of the state, which is.
the preservation of order.

In regard to the question of

Hobbes’s religious beliefs, Ebenstein believes that he had
none.

Apparently he considers Hobbes to have been an

atheist,
Considering the above views in the aggregate, one
can discern the traditional interpretation of Hobbes’s
political philosophy.

The majority of the writers feel

that the Hobbesiah man is an egotistical creature who,
outside of political society, will be in a oons.tant: and
ruthless state of competition with his fellows.

Secondly,

they believe that the Hobbesian laws of nature are theo
rems that are conducive to self-preservation, i.e, they
©
are not -natural laws in the traditional sense. These
theorems prescribe peace as a condition essential to indi
vidual self-preservation and felicity.

ilbid,, 126

Men, then, are
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obliged to obey the social contract that they make because
it is conducive to their self-preservation to do so*.

And

once the sovereign has been established he will require
his subjects to obey the covenant.

Also, a majority of

the subjects will feel that it is to their advantage to
carry out the contract and allow their sovereign to pun-,
ish any violators.

In nearly all of,the circumstances the

violators would be in the minority.

Once in power the sov

ereign authority is complete; he can suppress any opinion
and subordinate any corporation which he feels is sub
versive to the state.

The church will be fused with /the

state for a dual reason: firstly, the sovereign will be
the authoritative interpreter of the scriptures; and sec
ondly, by being head of the church, the sovereign will be
in a better position to promote order and security.

In

regard to the question of Hobbes’s religious beliefs, most
of the writers believe that if

Hobbes was not an atheist,

he was skirting the fringes of

this position.

There is some disagreement among the writers con
cerning morality in the civil state, but the majority
faould ultimately conclude that

in the Hobbesian state mo

rality is merely the sovereign

fiat. Instead of having a

set of moral standards determined by the interrelationships
of the various members of the community, there would be a
situation where the sovereign would force his will upon
his subjects, and in doing so would term his will moral.
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If the primary goal of the state is security, a situation
of this type could presumably exist, for the subjects would
feel that even a bad law is better than no law at all*
The traditional interpretation, as the reader has
undoubtedly noted, has at times ignored or generalized cer
tain facets of Hobbes’s political theory for the purpose of
maintaining consistency*

It is for perhaps this reason

that contemporary scholars have begun to re-examine Hobbes’s
political philosophy*

The results of these re-examinations,

however, have often been drastic changes in the basic
structure of the ’’official” interpretation*
^’’Official” is a term employed by Howard Warrender
to describe the traditional interpretation* Howard Warrender,
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes(Oxford; Clarendon Press,
1957).

CHAPTER II
THE NEW INTERPRETATIONS
The new interpretations of Hobbes’s political phil
osophy are, for the most part, the results of meticulous exam
inations of Hobbes’s basic works*

This particular method of

research perhaps manifests the desire on the part of the au
thors to illuminate certain tenets of Hobbes’s theory that
the traditional interpretation has tended to ignore*

Thus

these scholars endeavor to resolve the inherent difficulties
in Hobbes's writings that consistently puzzle students of
Hobbes’s political philosophy.

The attempts to clarify the

traditional interpretation have, however, changed the very
basis, of that interpretation.

The traditionalists have no

objections to having their interpretation clarified, but
they cannot allow their very position to be subverted.

This

chapter, however, will be devoted only to an examination of
the,new interpretations.

The disputations among the various

schools of interpretationrwill be considered in the next
chapter.
The first major departure from the standard inter
pretation occurred in 1936 when Leo Strauss published The
Political Philosophy of Hobbes.'*' Strauss, a noted German
^Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, trans.
Elsa Mo Sinclair(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952)o
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scholar of the Hegelian school, was drawn to Hobbes after a
study of Spinoza because the latter had virtually adopted the
1
moral and political philosophy of Hobbes.
Strauss employs
the genetic method, i.e., a thorough examination and pointby-point comparison of all Hobbes's writings, from the earli
est to the last.

The results of this particular method of

research are some unusual conclusions concerning the origin
and growth of Hobbes’s political philosophya

According to

Strauss, the Leviathan must be interpreted in the light of
these conclusions.
The basis of Hobbes’s political philosophy, con
tends Strauss, lies somewhere between the naturalistic and
idealistic philosophical traditions.

By starting with

’’right,” and denying the primacy of law, Hobbes deviates
from the idealistic tradition^ and on the other hand, by
employing ’’right,” and not natural inclinations and appe
tites as the basis of morals and politics, Hobbes does not
confbrm to the naturalistic tradition.

Hobbes finally per

ceives the incompatibility between natural right and natu
ral appetite. Consequently, it is Hobbes’s view of funda,IStrauss uses Hegel’s philosophy touarrive at dif
ferent conclusions. Leo Strauss, currently a professor of
political philosophy at the University of Chicago,, was born
in Germany in 1&90.
He received his Doctor of Philosophy
degree in 1921 from Hamburg University.
A few years later
he emigrated and in 1944 became a naturalized American cit
izen. Strauss is perhaps best-known to his contemporaries
for his radical innovations in the field of political the
ory and his vigorous opposition to the behavioral sciences.
Strauss has published several books including On Tyranny.
Natural Right and History, and Thoughts on Machiavelli.
W h o ’s Who in America. Vol. X X X I , 1960-1961, 3036.
~
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mental human behavior, and not seventeenth-century science,
that is the basis of Hobbes ’s political philosophy.
ence, when utilized at all, is only a method.

Sci

His political

philosophy demands an applicable morality, based upon an
analysis of human passion, and compatible with human will*
For Hobbes, this morality emanates from the action of hu
man wills upon each other, and not from a superhuman au
thority imposing obligations from above.
Morality is established on that passion,, the fear
of violent death, that compels men to adopt and maintain a
rational system of conduct in order to escape the blind ir
rational desires of their own nature.

Men are naturally

divided by mutual fear, and their relations are determined
by those claims which they can compel their fellow men to
acknowledge.

The indispensible element of Hobbes’s sys

tem, asserts Strauss, is a moral and humanistic antithesis
between fundamentally unjust vanity and fundamentally just
fear of violent death.
According to Strauss, there are two central postu
lates of human nature in Hobbes’s theory.

The first of

these is vanity, i .e t b e . . p l e a sure ttiilch a man derives
from the consideration of his own real or imaginary power.
Vanity is the basis of the natural appetite of the Hob
besian man.

Consequently, man’s natural appetite is no

thing but a striving for precedence over others, and for
a recognition of this precedence.

The passions are the

particular ways of striving after this recognition,,
offers several proofs for this assentation.

Strauss

One of these is

the war of everyone against everyone cast in terms of vanity
Thus the causes of this war lie in the desire of each man to
surpass every other<,

Another proof offered consists of a

paragraph taken from the Leviathan, where Hobbes makes refer
ence to the great Leviathan as being "King of the Proud
The second main postulate, according to Strauss, is that of
natural reason, which Hobbes reduces to the principle of
self-preservation; that is, "since the preservation of life
is the condition sine qua non for the satisfaction of any
appetite, it is ?the primary good’,,"

On the other hand,

death is the primary evil, having its affirmation in pas
sion —

the passion of fear of death,,

Since the fear of

death forces man to believe that life is the primary good,
it/ is the absolute standard of reference by which a man can
order his life.

Only through the knowledge of death can

man have an aim in life -- avoiding death.

Strauss states t

This fear of a violent death, prerational in origin, but rational in ef
fect, and the rational principle of selfpreservation, is, according to Hobbes,
the root of all right and therewith of :
all morality.3
The result is, then, that Hobbes denies moral value to all
^Strauss, op. cit.„ 13.
2Ib id .. 15.
3Ibid,. 17.
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virtues which do not proceed from the fear of violent death.
This basic antithesis of Hobbes’s theory is between
vanity as the root of natural appetite, and the fear of vio1
lent death as the passion which brings men to reason. By
virtue of his nature, the Hobbesian man lives in a dream of
the happiness of approaching triumph.

So deep i s his dream

that only a forcible and imposing power will awaken him
this power is death.

The ideal condition for self-know

ledge by the Hobbesian man is mortal danger.

Here, then,

lies the connecting link between the two postulates of human nature.

Vanity, taken by itself, leads to mortal con

flict, by virtue of the fact that although man first lives
in a world of imagination, he must enter the real world to
discern if others feel about him the way he feels about
himself.

His claim to superiority is either recognized by

others or it is not; in either ease there arises a feeling
of contempt on one side.

The man who is slighted will seek

revenge, with the result that physical combat will ensue.
Somewhere in the course of this mortal conflict the will to
triumph of the person seeking revenge is moderated by a
fear for his personal safety.

It is here in this life and

death struggle that the futility of vanity is exposed.

Al

so at this point the concept of the artificial state arises,
1Ibid., IS.
2Ibid., 22.
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for when both combatants become seized with fear for their
lives, they overcome their vanity and the shame of confes
sing their timorousness and,
recognize as their real enemy not the
rival, but that terrible enemy of nature,
death, who, as their common enemy, forces
them to mutual understanding, trust and
union, and fear procures.them the possibil- ,
ity of completing the founding of the State
for the purpose of providing safeguards for
the longest possible term, against the eom-mon enemy„1
The origin of the state in mutual fear also has moral signigicance in Hobbes’s political philosophy„
Strauss contends that Hobbes is cognizant of the
distinction between legality and morality, because the
Hobbesian maniis just according to the morality of the purp
pose and not the legality of the action,.
This German
scholar.asserts that Hobbes, "in believing that the moral
attitude, conscience, intention, is of more importance than
the action, -- is at one with Kant as with the Christian
tradition,"3

Hobbes deviates from this tradition only

by his denial of the possibility that just and unjust actions
may be established apart from human legislation„

Strauss

goes so far as to assert that just and unjust intentions
are possible in the state of nature, for not every in1 ibid.
^ I b i d o ,

3Ibid-0

2 3 o

tention is permitted, except that of self-preservation.

Un

just attitudes, therefore, stem from pride, while the just
intentions arise from the fear of violent death.

For Strauss

maintains:
What man does from fear of death, in
his consciousness of his weakness at the
. hands of other men, when he honestly con
fesses to himself and to others his weak
ness and his fear of death, unconcerned
about his honor, this alone is fundamen
tally just...
Conscience is thus identified with the fear of death,-and
it is this identification which permits a differentiation
between justice and injustice.

It is the unjust man who

obeys the laws of the state for fear of punishment, with
out inner conviction, and the just man who obeys them because of inner conviction —

the fear of death.2

In retro

spect, one may conclude that according to Strauss, Hobbes,
established his morality on that passion, the fear Of vior
lent death, which forces men to institute a rational system
of conduct in order to escape the emulatory and illusory
tenets of their own nature.

Strauss’s conception of Hob-*

besian morality is thus as radical as his de-emphasis on
science in the Hobbesian philosophical system.
It would seem that the question of moral and pol
itical obligation in the philosophy of Hobbes holds a par
ticular fascination for certain of his students because,

•kfbid.« 25 o
2Ibid.
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commencing in 193&, there have been three major interpre
tations concerning this facet of his theory.

These inter

pretations are partial rebuttals of the orthodox approach
which denies the existence of morality in the Hobbesian state
of nature and asserts that, in his civil state, morality is
only the fiat of the sovereign authority.
The first of these interpretations is that of A, E.
■
1
Taylor, a graduate of *New College, Oxford,

Taylor advances

the thesis that Hobbes’s ethical doctrine has no logical
connection with his egotistical philosophy, and is a strict
deontology which is curiously suggestive of some of the
characteristic theses of Kant,

In an explication of his

analogy between certain facets of Hobbes and Kant, he points
to Hobbes’s distinction between the justice of an act and
3-A, E. Taylor. ’’The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes,”
Philosophy, Vol. XIIl(l93&), 406-424, Alfred Edward Taylor,
a scholar and philosopher, was born in 1669 and died in 1945.
He received his higher education from Kingswood School, Bath,
and New College, Oxford, where he was elected a scholar and
later an Honorary Fellow, Except for a short period in the
military service his career was entirely academic. He be
gan as a Fellow at Morton College, Oxford and finished as
a professor of moral philosophy at the University of Edin
burgh*
Taylor divided his study of philosophy into essentially
three parts. Firstly, he had a conception of the task of
metaphysical philosophy formed from reading Ernst Mac'h,
partly from his associates at Manchester and St, Andrews,
and.partly as a result of a sustained study of Galileo,
Leibniz, and Descartes,
Secondly, Taylor’s deep interest
in the problem of religion drove him to study the medie
val Schoolmen,
Thus he contributed to the development of
neo-scholasticism. And lastly, he was a profound student of
Plato and Aristotle,
He also mastered Kant’s ethics, how
ever, During his academic career Taylor received many hon
orary degrees, including a Doctor of Literature and a Doctor
of Laws from St. Andrews.
Dictionary of National Biography,
6th Suppl., ed. L. G, Legg and E'. T. Williams (Oxford University Press, 1959), S6 4 -S6 5 .
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the justice of a person.

Taylor employs a passage from

De Cive where Hobbes states,
to be just signifies to be delighted
in just dealing, to study how to do rightousness, or to endeavor in all things to
do that which is just; and to be unjust is
to neglect righteous dealings, or to think
it is to be measured not according to my
contract but some present„benefit
This Oxford scholar then contends that this is precisely
Kant's distinction between action done merely in accord
with the law and action done from the law,
with the characteristic difference
that Hobbes is trying to reduce the law
from which the virtuous man acts, to the
single law that a promise once duly made
must be kept.
In the opinion of this author Hobbes also goes so far as
to anticipate Kant's attempt to reduce all really wrong
willing to the irrational attempt to will both sides of
the contradiction at once,

Taylor continues by asserting

that Hobbes's thought is at bottom the same as Kant's, but
Hobbes reduces all injury to the violation of an express
or implied promise and he has not, like Kant, "thought of
the universalizing of a maxim as a criterion of its free3

dom from c o n t r a d i c t i o n T h e important point, according
to Taylor, is that Hobbes agrees with Kant on the "im^Taylor, op„ cit»„ 408,
2Ibid.. 409*
3Ibido
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perative” character of the moral law, just as he agrees with
him in the assertation that it is the law of ’’right reason.”1
Taylor, in support of his characterization of Hobbes
as

a deontologist,asserts that the moral obligation to obey

the natural law exists prior to the sovereign and the civil
society, for ’’even in the ’state of nature’ the law obliges
in

forointerno, though Hobbes is careful not to add,

always

in

foro externo.”^ However, the reference to in foro

ex-

ter.no is only a playing of words, contends Taylor, to remind
us that the laws require reciprocal obligations, and that
when there is no common power to act as protector, a man
must judge for himself whether his desire for peace is recip
rocated on the part of other men.

Another implication pres

ent here is that moral law may be violated by an improper
thought or purpose.

One must remember, asserts Taylor,

that even in the civil state, there is a large area where
the sovereign has not legislated, and here natural law ob
liges man to exhibit equity, which is Hobbes’s ’’Golden
Rule,’’ i.e., do not unto another what you are unwilling to
have done to yourself.3

All obligations, then, including

the one to honor your covenant by strict obedience to the
sovereign, are derived from a natural law.
if■

.

1Ibid., 410o
2Ibid.. 411o
3Ibid.. 412.

The sovereign
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does nothing to create the obligation to keep a covenant,
all he really does is decree that the
performance of certain covenants is illegal
and to prescribe the precise forms of declarations of our intentions which his
courts will regard as constituting a con
tract
The duty to obey the civil law arises from the fact that
the subject has covenanted to be loyal and obey the sov
ereign, and therefore if he voids the covenant he would
be violating natural law.

Taylor continues by declaring

that the duty of obeying the civil laws follows as a part
of a consistent deontology, for natural law is not super
seded by positive law in the civilized society.

Rather

there is the duty in Hobbes’s society to recognize the
sovereign’s commands as the rule of life.

Even if one

disapproves of a particular command, he is bound by a
’’prior obligation” to comply with it, for its violation
would constitute bad faith.

2

According to Taylor, the deontological character
of Hobbes’s thought is also brought out in the doctrine
that the civil sovereign is just as. much under a rigid
law of moral obligation as are his subjects, for he is
obligated to equity, the strict observance of natural law,
The sovereign has the duty of promoting the public good,
and a duty entails following what is prescribed by law;
•klbid., 413 *
2Ibid., 415.

47
and for Hobbes all law is a command of the person whose
precept contains within it the reason of obedience.

Nat

ural law, then, limits the sovereign because it is the
command of God.

Taylor further states:

To recognize them as laws, we must
also know that they are the commands of
God; and since Hobbes teaches us that a
law which binds in foro interno is not
really complied with unless there is a
formal intention to obey it as law, we
do not really fulfill the demands of eq
uity unless we obey the divine command
as such, because it is a divine command.-3How does Hobbes know that natural laws are the commands
of God?

Taylor contends that Hobbes is led to this con

viction not so much by the Scriptural testimonies which
he produces in such profession, "as by the unusual depth
of his own sense of moral obligation.”

In conclusion,

Taylor asserts that in Hobbes’s political philosophy
there is a moral obligation originating in natural.law,
which is binding on both sovereign and subjects.

The

obligatory force of civil law is derived entirely from
our obligation to observe natural law.

Hobbes’s pol

itical philosophy, then, is a deontology characterized
by a consistent moral o-bli gat ion present throughout
his whole account of man in both the state of nature
and civil society...
3-1 bid.. 419.
2Ibid.. 422.
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Professor Michael Oakeshott has also interpreted
Hobbes’s theory of moral and political obligation in a
radical manner.^

Furthermore, he avowedly challenges all

previous critics of Hobbes.

If one is to believe Oake

shott, he is the first man in history to understand Hobbes.
He divides the opponents of Hobbes into two classes, the
emotional and the intellectual.

The first class he dis

misses lightly, saying their opinions of Hobbes are de
rived from emotional irrationalism.

He considers the

critics of the second class more important, however, for
it is through them that Hobbes has influenced the history
of ideas.

According to Oakeshott, these men have shown

a regrettable tendency to fix their attention on Hobbes’s
obvious errors, and to lose sight of his philosophy as a
whole.

Moreover, they have failed to detect the tradition

to which his civil philosophy btlOngs, which has led to
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott,
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946). Michael Joseph Oakeshott,
born in 1901, is currently a professor of political science
at the London School of Economics and Political Science,
University of London.
He received his higher education from
St. George’s School, Harpendon; Gonville and Caius College,
Cambridge; and Nuffield College, Oxford. In his view of
politics he is a conservative who looks with disfavor upon
idealogical politics.
Furthermore, he accepts tradition,
and in doing so places an emphasis upon the limitation of
reason and the importance of practical as against technical
knowledge in the world of affairs.
Oakeshott has written
several books including, Experience and Its Mo des, and Sor;
cial and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe. W h o ’s
W h o ,. I960, 2251 o Neal Wood”, ”A Guide to the Classics:
Skepticism of Professor Oakeshott,” Journal of Politics,
X X I (1959), 647-662.
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the misconception that it belongs to none.

For Oakeshott,

then, no writer has suffered more at the hands of little
men than Hobbes.
Although Oakeshott!s thoughts on the question of
Hobbes’s moral and political obligation are perhpas the
most important in his entire interpretation, it is also nec
e s s a r y to discuss other parts of his exegesis.

Oakeshott,

like Strauss, advances the contention that the greatest of
all hindrances to the acquiring of felicity by the Hobbesian man is pride.

Pride, the desire for superiority, is

an illusion, and will hinder a man from choosing the best
route to felicity, even when he is alone.

The purging

emotion for pride is the fear of death, which necessitates
prudence and thus makes man a civilized creature.

What is

gained by sagacity will be augmented by reason, for it is
reason that discovers certain truths for the guidance of
men in their common and collective pursuit of felicity.
Oakeshott asserts that the Hobbesian man can design his
own deliverance when ’’inspired by passion (fear of death)
and instructed by r e a s o n . . . T h e s e truths are none other
than the laws of nature.

Furthermore,

there is one conclusion which com
prehends the whole method of reasoning
in this matter: when there are a number
of men, felicity is impossible of at
tainment unless each man acts so as not
to do to another what- he would-'have* not
^Oakeshott, ed., op. cit.„ xxxvii.
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done to himself*
This is Hobbeses ’’Golden Rule” paraphrased.

Peace and se

curity are the common negative conditions without which fe
licity is impossible, i.e.,
it is negative because it follows from
our conception of the character of the in
dividual and his felicity that one man can
promote the felicity of another only nega
tively by forbearance, not positively by
activity.2
The second and third laws of nature are additional conclu
sions of m a n ’s reasoning contingent on the primary prin
ciple, and there is a supplementary proviso that no man
can agree to act
suit

of

in any way as to preclude his further pur

felicityThe

men will covenant, then, in order

to pursue their individual felicity.

But one must remem

ber, avers Oakeshott, that a covenant in this situation
can never be anything but a state of will, for there can
not be an executed contract.

What each man undertakes is

to maintain a certain state of will, i.e., "what each man
undertakes is always doing and never done.”^

The required

state of will would only be possible from a perpetual main
tenance of a covenant -- the daily keeping of a promise —
which can never obtain the fixed and conclusive character
•krbid., xxxvi .
^Ibid., xxxvii.
3Ibid.
^•Ibid.. xxxviii.

51
of a contract performed once and for eternity.

The cov-

enant institutes an office, which is a representative will;,
and not a common will, of the subjects., It is impossible
to transfer a common will, asserts Oakeshott.

This office

is distinct from the natural person or persons who hold i t „
The sovereign authority so instituted has both rights and
duties.

The rights are liberties, i»eo, what it may do;
p
while the duties are what it must do.
The duties are contingent upon the end for which the sovereign is instituted
—

success, whereas its rights are gained from transference

as a consequence of the covenant.

At this point Oakeshott

contends,
but, since what was transferred was the
natural right of each man to do whatever
he wills, the rights in the sovereign must
be those of a natural man. The paradox of
the civil society is that in it the extent
of the rights of the artificial man, called
Sovereign, are determined by nature. And,
just as the natural right of each man was
to do what was needful to procure good for
himself, the artificial right of the sov
ereign is to do what is needful to procure
the only good that can be said to be uni
versally desired -- the benefit of p ea ce. 3
The relation of the sovereign authority to the sub
ject, where one commands and the other obeys, contends Oake
shott, is not one that excludes liberty, but actually im
•^I b i d o

2Ibido, xl„
3Ibid.
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plies it; for liberties are rights which arise from the si
lence of law*

The silence of law will brood over large a-

reas of the subject’s actions, and where there is silence
there is liberty*

Also law as a command implies liberty in

the person commanded*

In the first place, there is a lib

erty of mental activity; and furthermore, since all com
mands are generally abstract, the lawmaker assumes that the
subject has the ability to ’’fill in the detail and trans
late the generality into an act in which this generality is
fulfilled*’’-*- Therefore, even though a large proportion of
the acts of a subject are under the control of a command,
’’there remains inside every act of obedience an area of un2
assailable liberty*”
Oakeshott again deviates from the orthodox inter
pretation when he contends that Hobbes’s civil state is a
Christian commonwealth, i.e., composed of Christian subjects
under a Christian sovereign*

In this Christian commonwealth

the privilege of each man to interpret scripture and deter
mine the laws of God by his own reason will be transferred
to the -sovereign with the rest of his natural right, for
the liberty to interpret is not a distinct part of each
man’s general natural right*3
•*-Ibid *, xli.v*: *
^Ibid*
^Ibi do, xlvrii*
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will settle and interpret scripture and thus determine au
thoritatively the rules that belong to the laws of God and
nature.

There exist laws, however* in a Christian common

wealth which even the sovereign must obey.

These laws are

from God, creating an obligation for the sovereign.

Also,

the subject, by virtue of the fact that he is a Christian,
has a corresponding extension of both his obligation and
his r i g h t T h e

rule of his religion provides a new sanc

tion for the observance of his obligation.

Furthermore,

the articles of peace are for him no
longer merely the conclusions of reasoning
legitimately enforced by the sovereign
power; they are also laws of God,
To ob
serve the covenant he has made with his
fellow becomes a religious obligation as
well as a piece of prudential wisdom and
civil duty.2
The last tenet and perhaps the most controversial
part of Oakeshott’s interpretation is his elucidation of
Hobbes’s theory of obligation.

Oakeshott, when interpret

ing Hobbes, distinguishes among four types of obligation;
physical, rational, moral, and political.

Physical obli

gation arises when a man is prevented, forbidden, or bound,
by the power of another from performing an action that he
has willed.

This form of obligation involves an external

impediment to a man’s power, and as such is unrelated to
his natural right.

In addition to this, a man may be pre

llbid,, xlix,
2Ibid.
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vented from willing a particular action because he perceives
that its probable consequences are damaging to himself.

In

this type of situation the ’’impediment is internal, a combination of rational preception and fear, which is aversion from
something believed to be hurtful.”!

Here again, in ration

al .obligation, although the power to will an action is im
peded, no facet of a m a n ’s natural right is limited.
But there is yet another and entirely different type
of obligation that curtails natural right per s e, instead
of only the power to exercise it.

This new type of obli-

gation is moral, and arises from the effect of authority.

2

Authority, according to Oakeshott, is a right which emanates
from a wills
An authority is a will that has been
given a Right by a process called author
ization, which (in turn) is the voluntary
act of those who are to be morally oblig
ed or bound by the commands of the author
ized will.
This voluntary act of author
ization is a surrender (by mutual coven
ant) of the natural Right of each man,
which, in a single act, creates and endows
with authority an artificial Representa
tive man or body of men who, in respect
of this endowment, is called Sovereign,
The exercise of the will of the Sovereign
is called legislation, and moral obli
gation is the offspring of laws so made.
The sole cause of the moral obligation is
the will of this Sovereign authority; the
only sort of action to which the term moral
obligation is applicable is obedience to
libido j, lix,
2Ibid0

the commands of an authority authorized by
the voluntary act of him who is bound. .The
answer to the question, Why am I morally
bound to obey the will of the Sovereign?
Because I have authorized the Sovereign,
'avouched1 his actions, and am ’bound' by
my own act.'1
Oakeshott qualifies the above statement by saying
that the covenant does not itself create moral obligations,
"it is not itself morally obligatory and not being a law
(the will of the Sovereign), it does not itself make any
conduct morally obligatory.”2

There was a rational obli

gation involved in the making of the covenant, but this in
no way creates moral obligation.

However, the contract

may become morally obligatory if the sovereign commands its
obedience.

Oakeshott further asserts that moral obligations

are not based on self-interest, for self-interest is a ra
tional obligation which cannot bqcome moral until commanded
i
by the sovereign. Also, moral obligation is not contingent
upon the superior power of the sovereign authority, for
right is never identified with power and "a Sovereign that
had no Right (that is, no authorization) could only bind
physically, and not m o r a l l y . U l t i m a t e l y ,

there is no

other law independent of the sovereign’s will.

Consequent

ly there are no moral obligations independent of this sov
ereign fiat.

Therefore, natural law is not legally binding

-^T b i d ., lx.
2Ib id .
•^Ibid., lx.

upon the subjects until the sovereign has willed its dic
tates o

Nor is the word of God as given in the scriptures

binding, except in the authoritative version; therefore,
"laws springing from that interpretation are morally obli
gatory, not because they are God's, but because they are
the Sovereign’s.”^
Political obligation, according to Oakeshott, is
a mixture of physical, rational, and moral obligation d e - .
signed to serve one end, but which are never assimilated
to each other, i.e., ’’civil society is a complex of au
thority and power in which each element creates its own
appropriate obligation.”

2

Oakeshott concludes by saying

that each of these obligations provides a ^separate motive
for. creating the civil state, and each is necessary for
the preservation of that commonwealth.
The above paragraph concludes the analysis of Oake
shott’s interpretation.

As the reader has now discerned,

various tenets of this elucidation are rather arbitrary.
Nevertheless, to the sorrow of other Hobbesian scholars,
Oakeshott’s interpretation is very influential, for it is
contained in the introduction to Blackwell's edition of
the Leviathan which is widely used in the teaching of. po
litical theory.
The latest major interpretation of Hobbes’s theory
•^Ibid. „ lxi.
2Ibid.
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of obligation is set forth in a book by Howard Warrender,
entitled The Political Philosophy of Hobbes.1

For the most

part this book is a detailed exegesis of A. E. Taylor’s ear
lier article, with the addition of certain new points.
main thesis of Warrender is set

The

forth in the following para

graph :
Hobbes says so much about self-preservatioh that it is easily regarded as being
central in his theory of obligation.
This
is so far from being the case that it is
not a part of the theory as such* but an
empirical postulate employed in its appli
cation. A denial of Hobbes’s psychology,
therefore, merely poses a new problem of
application, but leaves his theory of ob
ligation, in the proper sense, unaffected.^
Warrender contends that in Hobbes’s political phil
osophy there is a consistent theory of obligation that is
present throughout his whole account of man, in both the
state of nature and civil society.

Political obligation is

not a new type of obligation created by the covenant, but
rather it springs from a moral obligation to obey the laws
of. nature.

Hence the difference between the state of nature

and civil society is

that some of the duties which are

pended in one become

operative in the other.

According to

sus

Warrender, there are in the state of

nature general obligations to seek peace and to preserve a
^Howard Warrender, The^Political Philosophy of Hobbes
(Oxford: Clarendon..Press, 1957). Currently Warrender instructs political theory in the Queen’s University at Belfast.
2

Warrender, o p . ’cit.. 93
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readiness of mind to obey the laws of nature.

In this sit

uation, intentions are judged as well as actions.

The ob

ligatoriness of the laws of nature emanates from the fact
that they are the commands of God.

In this case, then, as

law is the command of one whose precept contains it in the
reason for obedience, the laws are to be obeyed simply be
cause they are the laws of God.

The laws of nature, how

ever, will not oblige those who do not accept God as allpowerful, i.e., insane persons, children, and atheists.
Therefore, the state of nature is not by any means one in
which there are no obligations, and "still less it is a
"1
state where there are no moral principles.T,JWarrender continues by saying that obligation in
the civil state does not depend in any way upon the social
contract or upon the command of the civil sovereign.

Rath

er the ground of obligations is always present, for it orig
inates in the commands of God in His natural Kingdom.. The
function of the sovereign is to provide the validating con
dition for the employment of this obligation, "in a system
of .rights and duties that he himself does not create-or
control."

2

The validating condition is "sufficient secur

ity," and so the difference between the state of nature and
civil society is one -of circumstance and not of moral...prin
ciples.

The sovereign does not provide an obligation to

XIbid.. 102.
2Ibid.. 2S.
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keep valid covenants, rather he makes possible circumstances
in which there are valid covenants to keep.

As Warrender

contends, the obligation to obey covenants is the third law
of nature.

Laws and covenants are only the instruments of

obligation and not the source.

Perhaps a good summary of

the above is a paragraph from Warrender’s book:
Providing that certain validating con- .
ditions are satisfied, men are always bound
by law, and they may further extend such
obligation by covenant. The account of
civil society is essentially an account of
how these validating conditions may become
satisfied.
The civil sovereign prescribes
neither the ground of obligations nor the
terms under which they are valid in any
particular case, but is concerned entirely
with the satisfaction of conditions: which,
he himself does not specify.
The resul
tant pattern of obligations in civil soci
ety is, therefore, the product under spe
cial circumstances, of moral principles
which bind as men, and not simply as cit
izens.!
As previously stated, Warrenderfs thesis is basically
that of Taylor’s, with some minor exceptions.

In the first

instance, Warrender does not agree with Taylor’s analysis of
obligation in the state of nature in terms of reciprocity.
Warrender contends that this position cannot be justified in
terms of Hobbes’s text.

In the second place, he asserts

that because Taylor is concerned only with sovereignty by
institution, he ignores Hobbes’s illustration of sovereignty
by conquest or acquisition.

In the 'last place, Warrender

will not suscribe to the analogies between the doctrines of

1Ibid.. 102.
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Hobbes and Kant, for Warrender contends that such drawing
of analogies is misleading,,

Any similarities generally turn

but to be superficial,,
Warrender is undoubtedly an astute scholar, but his
work suffers because it is written in an atrocious style,
which .inhibits lucidity.

Furthermore, he attempts to at

tribute a higher degree of consistency to Hobbes’s philos
ophy than it actually possesses.
Two other interpretations merit consideration before
this chapter is brought to a close.

The first of these is

set forth in an article ’’Hobbes and Hobbism”,;by S. B.iLamprecht, a professor at Amherst College.^

In his article

Lamprecht distinguishes between the traditional interpreta^
tion and what he terms the correct one.
Lamprecht commences his article by stating that the
picture of the Hobbesian man in a state of nature is not
intended by Hobbes to be .a complete view of human nature.
His portrait is of only one aspect of human nature, "an as
pect which may at times be competently controlled, but can
^•S. P. Lamprecht, ’’Hobbes and Hobbism,’’ American Po
litical Science Review. XXXIV{ 1940),, 31-53.
Sterling Power
Lamprecht, born in 1S90, received his higher education from
four schools: Williams College; Harvard University; Union
Theological Seminary; and Columbia University. He commenced
his academic career as an instructor of philosophy at Colum
bia, and continued there until 192$, when he moved to Amherst
CQllege, where he has remained ever since. Lamprecht has
published several books, including Our Religious Tradition,
Mature and History, and Our Philosophical Traditions. Di
rectory of American Scholars, 3rd- ed., ed„ Jaques Cattell
(New York: R. R. Bowker Co., 1957), 427.
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never possibly be eradicated.”"*" The concept of man in a
state of nature, Hobbes regards as a permanent factor with
in society, a factor with which all sound social authority
must be constantly occupied.

This is an ever-present menace

against which man must always be on his guard.

According to

this Amherst scholar, then, the concept of man in a state of
nature is useful in enabling one to estimate the importance
of the social bonds that determine the conduct of any man
he might wish to study.

At this point Lamprecht makes a

radical assertion when he states that ’’Hobbes was not so
poor a psychologist as to overlook m a n ’s genuinely social
interestHobbes

saw that a lucid concept of a man in the

state of nature is a prerequisite for any formation.of an
effective technique of social control, since the difficul
ties of social life are not the results of m a n ’s better as
pects, but rather of his basic lusts.
Secondly, Lamprecht disagrees with those who main
tain that, for Hobbes, morality is the product of the ar
bitrary fiat of the sovereign, and consequently lacks all
validity apart from the sovereign’s control.

Hobbes,• asserts

Lamprecht, is speaking here in legalistic and not moral
terms where ’’justice and right are being defined in terms of
3
enforcement of a conformity to law.”^ This is an analytical
^Lamprecht, op. cit., 41 •

^Ibid.
^Ibid., 43 o
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position on Hobbes’s part, for where there is no law, there
is no question of right or justice.

Lamprecht summarizes

when he states:
Justice then begins only where laws ex
ist. And in the absence of law, might makes
right, not in the sense that might proves
wisdom or virtue to be resident in him who
exercises the might, but in the sense that
might, when irresistable, is a beginning of
a regime in which the distinction between
the ruler and the subjects is emerging, in
which, hence, the existence of the law is
beginning to manifest itself and conformity
to the law is incipiently required.1
A corollary to this remark, avers Lamprecht, is that
Hobbes is also insisting .that any significant morality is
social in character and presupposes the occurrence of reg
ularized procedures.

Morality is not considered when men

are separate, but only when they are in an integrated con
dition where the question of social adjustment arises.

This

Amherst professor feels that Hobbes will admit the existence
of a minor type of morality apart from social institutions,
but all the significant moral problems stem from the complex adjustments of men in a civil society.

The subject of

law is also involved here, for it is because justice and
right have important meanings as legal terms that morality
can be viewed as a social affair.

According to Lamprecht,

law creates ’’significant moral situations, ;.and Hobbes saw
this more clearly than any prior political philosopher of
1Ibid.
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modern times."

Any absence of law would result in chaos,

where the possibility of moral achievement would be annul
led by universal strife;
Hobbes dramatically was stressing the
point that morality (aside from a few triv
ial exceptions) arises in social life as
manifest in the existence of social instru
mentalities, or institutions to regularize
human relations, of laws to define and mod-.,
ify these relations, and of authorities to
enforce their observance.2
In the third place, contends Lamprecht, when Hobbes
states that the law-maker is always morally justified in
all his acts, he means that the source of the law cannot
logically be contrary to the law.

Hobbes repudiates the

belief that the king can do no wrong when he asserts that
the sovereign is subject to the laws of nature as well as
the dictates of reason.

Above all else the sovereign has

a duty to provide good government, and
not simply may a sovereign violate his
responsibilities to his people through indul
gence in vice or through neglect, but even a
conscientious sovereign may commit such vital
mistakes of judgment that his rule involves,
serious moral disaster.3
Lastly, Lamprecht compromises with the traditional
ists by stating that in the Hobbesian civil state there
can be no appeal to the law as a protection of popular
rights, since there are no popular rights other than the
i
*■■■
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^Ibid., 45 .
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passing whim of the sovereign.

Lamprecht even goes so far

as to endorse Hobbes in this position.

Firstly, he contends,

since social problems often admit of no settlement by com
promise, it is necessary to have a sovereign who can act with
impunity.

One of the conditions of civil life is the re

quirement of obeying governmental decisions, even if they
seem to have been made unwisely.

Secondly, it.is desirable

to have the will of the sovereign behind the law, for al
though law is very important, it cannot be the background
of all civil order.

Law is essentially static, and thus

ties a society to the level of past achievement.

Hobbes’s

appeal to sovereignty, then, is a release from outworn pre
cedent .
Lamprecht, then, has advanced four propositions that
he believes comprise the correct interpretation of Hobbes's
political philosophy.

It would appear, however, that he is

alone, in his belief that his interpretation is correct.
Iheolasfe; .interpretation which will be considered in
this chapter is that of Nathaniel H. Henry, who advances
the thesis that Hobbes is not an atheist.1

Henry has mar

shalled the courage to enter Hobbes’s labyrinth of biblical
verse, a maze which most scholars of Hobbes are quite con
tent t O ’=passuover.

This author arrives at his conclusion

•^Nathaniel H. Henry, ’’Milton and Hobbes: Mortalism
and the Intermediate 'State,” Studies in Philology,
(1951), 234-239o
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from an examination of Hobbes’s view of the intermediate
state, i.e., that dimension of space or time where the son!
is resident before it goes to either heaven or hell,
According to Henry, Hobbes presents the problem of
the intermediate state when he quotes from John i i i , 13;
”no man has ascended into heaven but he that come down from
heaven,”^

Hobbes then quotes from Acts ii, 34,.' where

St. Peter, ”■to prove the ascension of Christ,’*’ quoted Psalm
xvi:
’thou will not leave my soul in hell, nor
suffer thine holy one to see corruption,’ saith,
they were spoken, not of David, but of Christ;
and to prove it added this reason, ’For David
is not ascended into ’heaven»’2
At this point, asserts Henry, Hobbes sets forth the crux
of his position on soul sleeping, for which he gives the
Calvinist answer:3
’But to this a man may easily answer, and
say that though their bodies were not to ascend
till the general day of judgment, yet these
souls were in heaven as soon as they departed
from their bodies,, „„ ’4
What Hobbes says in the next sentence appears to
buttress his Calvinist position:
•^-Henry, op, cit<,„ 242 „
2Ibid.
^When a man dies, what happens to his soul? In
Christian theology there is the problem of an intermediate
state between death and the final day of judgment„ Some
say the soul sleeps during this time, while others main
tain that it wanders about, waiting for resurrection,,
4Henry, o p 0 cite, 242„
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’oooWhich also seemth to be confused by
the words of our savior (Luke 20:37,38), who
proving the resurrection out of the words of
Moses, saith thus, ’that the dead are raised,
even Moses shewed at the bush, when he cal-leth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and the
God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob„ For he
is not a God of the dead, but of the living;
for they live by him„’l
What follows in the next paragraph, according to
Henry, is an extension and expansion of the Calvinist posi
tion as regards election and predestination;
’But if these words to be understood (sic)
only on the morality of the soul, they prove
not at all that which our savior intended to
prove, which was the resurrection of the body,
that is, to say, the immortality of m a n D .
Therefore our savior meaneth that those pat
riarchs were immortal; not by a property con
sequent to the essence and nature of mankind;
but by the will of God, that was pleased of
his mere grace, to bestow eternal life upon
the faithful,^
Out of the above paragraphs taken from Hobbes’s
Leviathan, Henry concludes that Hobbes's religious position
is that of an orthodox Calvinist,

The above interpretation

perhaps furnishes excellent proof of the contention that
virtually any meaning can be read into Hobbes’s philosophy
by utilizing certain paragraphs and excluding others,
As the reader has easily discerned, the attempts to
resolve the inherent difficulties in Hobbes’.s' tBxt. .have only
compounded those difficulties.

It is with this view-in

mind, perhaps, that the traditionalists have taken such
violent issue with the innovaters.
XI bid,
2Ibid«

CHAPTER III
REBUTTALS AND COUNTER-REBUTTALS
Generally speaking, any innovation or departure
from the norm is greeted by skepticism.,

This skepticism

often manifests itself in written or verbal defenses of
the traditional, which in turn occasions a series of coun
ter-arguments from the innovators.

The contemporary study

of Hobbes’s political philosophy is characterized by pre
cisely this kind of situation, for at the present time com
petent students of political theory are quarreling over
what Hobbes actually m e a n t C e r t a i n l y these scholars must
realize that since they are battling in the realm of in
terpretation, no one view is entirely correct.

Neverthe

less,, the controversies become quite pungent at times.
The first set of debates centers around Oakeshott’s
interpretation of the Leviathan, with the participants be
ing two English scholars, J. M. Brown of Kings College, New
Castle.upon Tyne, and Dorothea Krook of Newham College,
Cambridge.

The -precipitant of this altercation was an ar

ticle by Brown in which he takes issue with certain parts
of Oakeshott’s interpretation.

Altogether, Brown differs

on .some eight points with Oakeshott.

However, for th'e

purpose of this discussion, several of these points will
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be combined.^
Firstly, Brown asserts that Oakeshott has introduced
the political covenant prematurely,, i.e., he believes Oake
shott has misread Hobbes's second law of nature as requiring
p
men to enter into a single agreement.
This agreement then
solidifies into a covenant, which in turn becomes a poli
tical covenant.

Brown asserts, however, that Hobbes did

not introduce the political covenant until later.^

Contin

uing, Brown maintains that Oakeshott has altered the third
law of nature so to direct men to keep their promises under
the agreement they make with each other.

In addition to

this, Oakeshott misquotes the very pasage where Hobbes in
troduces the political covenant, for Brown asserts: "In
the words Professor Oakeshott selects from this passage
'covenant' refers to covenants other than and unsupple
mented by the political c o ven ant .”4

Oakeshott inserts a

definite article before "covenant” and makes the words re
fer to the political covenant itself.

Such perversions,

according to Brown, obscure the difference'between Hobbes's
first and second parts, thus causing the true nature of
chapters fourteen and fifteen to be lost.

After Oakeshott

4j„ M. Brown, "A Note on Professor Oakeshott's Intro
duction to the Leviathan." Political Studies, 1(1953), 53-64.
2I b i d .. 54.
3lbid.
4lb id .
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has tortured Hobbes into saying that something besides the
political covenant is needed, he also forces Hobbes to say
what that is*

This new factor is a supreme authority with

enough power to enforce the political covenant perpetually.^
The real purpose of page 112, however, suggests Brown, is
to show that the political covenant is necessary to create
a power strong enough to secure peace, and not that there
must be a supreme power to enforce the political covenant.
If there was such a power to enforce covenants, the poli
tical covenant would not be necessary.
Secondly, Brown strongly disagrees with Oakeshott’s
version of Hobbes's theory of obligation.

He believes that

Hobbes’s doctrine does contain moral obligations, but not
the kinds that Oakeshott describes, and furthermore that
Oakeshott’s explanation of Hobbes’s different uses of the
word ” oblige” is ’’nothing more than an attempt to get us
to read Hobbes in a way that will suit Professor Oake
shott’s preconceptions.”3

Brown avers that the only pas

sage where Hobbes compares different uses of the term ’’ob
ligation” is not in the Leviathan at all, but in De Cive.
Here Hobbes distinguishes between two types of natural ob
ligation which, as one would guess, correspond to the
"physical” and "rational” obligations of Oakeshott.
1Ibid., 55 o
2Ibid.
3Ibid.. 57.

The
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actual passage where Hobbes speaks of the law of nature as
binding, contends Brown, is not one where the context requires obligation to be understood in Oakeshott?s rational
sense.

There is the possibility that these laws are moral

ly obligatory because they are the commands of God,
ever, this is only a possibility.

How

In any event, Brown is

more concerned about what Oakeshott does in the political
regions of Hobbes's doctrine.

This leads Brown into a

criticism of what he terms the "paradox of the covenant.
Oakeshott,. asserts Brown, entertains the view that the
moral obligation does not originate in the social contract,
but rather is contingent upon the sovereign's command; i,
e«,. the covenant does not make anything morally obligatory.
The covenant itself becomes binding in a moral sense only
when the sovereign commands its observance.

For Brown this

view is ridiculous, for he asserts that the law would have
no effect except for subjects who were previously obliged
to obey it.

This prior obligation is created only by the

political covenant,

Oakeshott?s inclusion of physical ob

ligation in political obligation is also rejected at this
time, for Brown contends that the conception of a sovereign
not delegated to act for his subjects would be a selfcontradiction for Hobbes,
Thirdly, Brown criticizes Oakeshott's interpreta
tion of the sovereign-to-subject relationship.

3.1 bid.. 5$o

On this.

vital point, asserts Brown, all Oakeshott does is to tell
us that the institution of the sovereign rights is illus
trative of their general scope, i.e., the nature of the
sovereign’s rights is determined by the social contract„
The rights of the sovereign authority are those which
have been transferred to it by covenant, and ” 5’since what
was transferred was the natural right of every man to do
what he wills, the rights in the sovereign must be those
of a natural man.5

For Brown this view is not plau

sible, as it does not explain how the sovereign gets his
authority.

Nor does he accept Oakeshott’s explanation

,that the right to all things is surrendered to the sov
ereign.

The notion of a transferrance of a ’’right to

all things” is for Brown both highly obscure and unverifiable in Hobbes’s doctrine.

In any event, none of Oake-

shott’s assertions even remotely resemble the points
made in the seventeenth chapter, from whence he draws his
references?

What this chapter does contain, asserts Brown,

is an argument to show that the sovereign cannot do in
justice, in the strict sense of injury, to his subjects,
’’because he can make no covenant to them upon his obser
vance of which their authorization of his acts should de
pend.”2
Fourthly, Brown disagrees with Oakeshott’s as-
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sertion that the sovereign has duties but no obligations.
"The meaning of t h i s / ’ contends Brown, TTis never cleared
up."1

In view of pages forty-five and forty-nine of

Oakeshott’s introduction, "duties" in the case of a heathen
sovereign could apparently only mean "functions," while in
the case of a Christian sovereign they would mean "moral
obligation."

In accord with Oakeshott’s supplementary ac

count of obligation neither the heathen nor any other sov
ereign could have duties in the sense of functions.

How

ever, for Oakeshott, the sovereign’s prime duty is the
making of laws, i.e., he lays down a general rule which cre
ates the artificial distinction peculiar to civil society,
the distinction between right and wrong.

These categories

replace the surrendered natural right as the consequence
of sovereignty, and from whence it follows that "no law can
p
be unjust."
For Brown this is a puzzling passage. Oake
shott refers to the twenty-sixth chapter in connection with
it, at which time Brown asserts that it is a misreading of
the beginning of this cahpter.

But, for Brown, this chap

ter means something else, for it is at this point that
Hobbes defines civil laws as those rules under which the
commonwealth commands the subject to make use of the distinc
tion between right and wrong.

And he does not, as Oakeshott

maintains, say that civil laws create the distinction be^Ibid.
2Ibid., 61.
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tween right and wrongo

Hobbes points out that the civil

laws are the rules of "just and u n j u s t n o t h i n g being re
puted unjust that is not contrary to some law.

Brown con-

dludes by saying that Oakeshott misreads all this to make
it support his general views about Hobbes, "whereas the
passage is neither for nor against these views, but is sim
ply irrelevant to them."'*'
Fifthly, asserts Brown, Oakeshott*s preconceptions
prevent- him from giving even an intelligible account of
the liberties of the subject*

Brown feels that Hobbes dis

tinguishes between liberties that arise from the silence of
law, and the "'true liberties of the subject...the things
which though commanded by the sovereign, he may neverthe
less, without injustice, refuse to do.'"2

Oakeshott be

gins by speaking of the former as if it were the whole mat
ter, then switches to the latter, and then back to the for
mer.

In the end Brown feels that Oakeshott*s
vague notion of 'transfer,' from sub
jects to sovereign, of a right to all things
consisting in an absence of moral obligation,
and his failure to explore the notion of 'in
jury,' leave him unable to report, or even
investigate, Hobbes's discussion of this whole
subject.3
In conclusion, Brown takes issue with Oakeshott's

interpretation of the role of the last two books of the
1Ibido
2Ibid.

^Ibid.. 62.
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Leviathan,

Oakeshott feels that in these books the Hob-

besian man emerges as a Christian, and consequently the
Hobbesian man must acknowledge obligation under the law
of God,

Therefore, all that Hobbes says about natural

law in the earlier chapters is an irrelevant anticipation
of the argument of the last two chapters of the book.
Hence, concludes Oakeshott, the Leviathan and De Cive are
best read backwards.

Brown, on the other hand, asserts

that for Hobbes "the ’laws of nature* are not rules of
moral obligation except to him as takes them as commands
of God,”'*' However, the taking of these commands as the
laws of God does not necessarily involve the acceptance
of the Christian or any other scriptures.

For Brown,

then, the last two books of the Leviathan are a masterly
special application, and in no way a correction of what
preceeds them.
In the final analysis, Brown believes that Oake
shott has misrepresented Hobbes throughout.

He also

feels that, in spite of Oakeshott*s criticisms of the
myths about Hobbes, his whole tendency is to support in
his own way an old myth —

that Hobbes’s political thought

consists in the application to political matter of a dog
matic and unintelligible moral philosophy.
Mrs. Dorothea Krook, in her article, starts with
the intention of defending Oakeshott’s views, but ends up
~*~Ibid., 63 0
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by setting forth her own interpretation,^

Krook sets the

temper of her argument at the very beginning with the as
sertion that Brown’s reading of the Leviathan is marred by
such a lamentable lack of comprehension that even when it
appears he has something interesting to say, it turns out
p
to be interesting only as a misconstruction.
In the first place, she criticizes Brown for in
terpreting the Leviathan as an account of a general hypo
thetical sequence of events, "followed by a _’masterly
special application’ to a particular historical situation,"
and for failing to understand Hobbes’s modus operandi,3
The virtue of Oakeshott, contends Krook, is that he rec
ognizes the Leviathan as a logical structure, while at
the same time he perceives Hobbes's method clearly.
Furthermore, it is characteristic of a logical work that
it can b;e read backwards, and in fact it must be if it is
to yield its full meaning.

The Leviathan is a case in

point, for we cannot understand part one (human nature)
unless we have part two (commonwealth) in our minds when
we are reading it.

In a sense, then, we do read from

part two back to part one.

That is, we read from the the

ory of the commonwealth back to the theory of man,

which

-^Dorothea Krook, "Mr, Brown’s Note; Annotated,"
Political Studies(1953), 216-227,
2Ibid,, 2 1 6 ,
3Ibid,
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1
is its logical ground in the structure of the Leviathan,,
Similiarly, part three must be read back into parts one
and two,
for it is Christian men and a generation
of the Christian commonwealth that.Hobbes has
in mind all the time:
it is only the final
proof of this that is postponed to parts two
and four, the ’proof’ consisting in the
~
Hobbesian reinterpretation of the Scriptures.
Furthermore, Brown’s view of Hobbes modus operandi
is not valid, i.e., for Brown believes that Hobbes devel
oped his doctrine in a series of discrete steps, neither
knowing nor caring what was ahead of each.

According to

Krook, Hobbes knew what he wanted to prove before he be
gan —

his consequences were implicit in his premises.
In the second place, Krook proceeds to criticize

certain of Brown’s assertions.

As for the political cov

enant, this critic is not so certain that it was not in
troduced before page 112 of the Leviathan, for before
part two there are explicit statements about commonwealth,
and its characteristics and consequences.

Furthermore,

asserts Krook,
it follows by necessary eonsquence from
Hobbes’s account of the nature of man, and is
stated explicitly on more than one occasion
before page 112, that all human covenants
must be ’political covenants’ -- if by ’po
litical’ covenant Mr. Brown means the 'only
thing he can mean, a covenant rendered ef1Ibid.. 217.
2Ibid.
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fieacious by the power to enforce the prom
ise made.l
In Hobbes’s definition, the pdwer to enforce the keeping
of promises among men is an essential part of the word
’’covenanto"

So the validity of Brown’s distinction be

tween pre-political and political covenants is a moot
point, because the passage on page 112 where Hobbes in
troduces the political covenant is a logical statement
and.not a historical or hypo-histroical one„
There is neither a sequence of events
in time nor even a hypothetical sequence
in hypothetical time, but only premises
and deductions, antecedents and conse
quents, definitions and the meaning of def
initions
According to Krook, Brown’s characterization of the last
two books of the Leviathan is highly misleading, if not
positively false0

She feels that these books form a

vital and integral part of the Leviathan,, It is clear
to Hobbes that parts three and four are vitally necessary
to the theory of the commonwealth in part two, and fur
thermore it is false to suggest, as Brown does,, that the
problem of scriptures is not approached until the thirtysecond chapter,,

Rather, Hobbes as early as chapter four

teen is interpreting certain text of the Holy Scriptures
when he speaks of the natural laws„3
1Ibid., 21$ „
2Ibido. 219o
3Ibid.. 220.

For example, the

?g
second law of nature is the "Golden Rule" paraphrased.
Krook asserts that the integral position of parts.three
and four in the argument of the Leviathan can best be y.
understood in the light of two aspects of Hobbes’s Chris
tian thought, namely, his nominalistie philosophy and his
skeptical view of scriptural interpretations."*'
Hobbes’s attitude towards the church in parts
three and four must be distinguished from his views to
wards religion in part one.

In part one, contends Krook,

Hobbes’s attitude was determined by his materialistic
metaphysic, whereas his attitude towards the dhurch in
parts three and four is that of a civil philosopher.
This accounts for his scornful treatment of religion,
and yet his. conspicuously sober and serious treatment
of the church.

Hobbes recognizes that the church is a

powerful political institution in a civil society, and
thus deserving of respectful treatment.2

For Hobbes’s

peculiar kind of Erastianism the problems of conflicting
loyalties between the church and state do not exist — >
he does not acknowledge the crucial difference in kind.
The word of God is nothing but black marks upon paper,
which have meaning only by arbitrary imposition.

Conse

quently, contends Krook, the problem of the relation of
Church and State is reduced to the problem of who shall
1Ibid.. 221o
2Ibid.
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interpret the Scriptures, and since Hobbes has already ahr- ■
swered this question,
he must attempt a reinterpretation of
the Scriptures that will establish and sup
port the supreme sovereignty of the civil
magistrate against the usurping claims of
the ecclesiastical authority...1
Brown, then, has failed to understand this, i.e.. Brown
does not understand that Hobbes must accept a Christian
Commonwealth;, and thus Hobbes is forced to undertake the
difficult and^delicate task of reinterpreting the Scriptures.

o
The next point with which Krook deals is Brown's

treatment of the Hobbesian theory of obligation.

She

feels that Brown’s remarks "are marred by a false dis
junction, which springs from the;more general misunder
standing already n o t i c e d . According to Brown, moral
obligation is ultimately derivative from God’s commands
or some other source.

If it seems to be contingent upon

both, then Hobbes is inconsistent about its derivation.
Krook feels, however, that the two sources are not mutual
ly exclusive.

Hobbes’s doctrine of obligation consists in

a moral obligation to do whatever one takes to be God’s
commands.

But one does not know God’s commands until the

sovereign lays them down, therefore moral obligation has
•k[bid o, 222
2Ibid„, 223
^Ibid., 224

another ground, i.e-., the absolute power of the sovereign
to declare and enforce the only interpretation of God's
commands that shall prevail in the commonwealth0^
Lastly, Krook criticizes Brown's interpretation of
the Hobbesian doctrine of right and wrong in relation to
civil law.

She contends that Brown's argument only gives

one measure of his misunderstanding of Hobbes's fundamen
tal philosophical doctrine, namely, nominalism.

All

definition is for Hobbes, "strictly and exclusively nom
inal," and all knowledge is a matter of setting down defi
nitions and drawing out the logical consequences of those
2
definitions.
But Krook was not to have the last word., for Brown
retorted with acrid invective.

Perhaps the counter-rebut

tal by Brown epitomizes the bellicose temper of this con
troversy.-^

He commences his article with the assertion

that Krook's charge against him of a lack of understanding
of Hobbes’s method is beyond credibility.

He further con

tends that he does recognize the Leviathan as a logical
structure, and that the assertion of Krook to the contra
ry is a mystification to him.

Krook’s problem is to trace

the logical structure of the Leviathan, and Brown feels
that she attempts to solve this enigma without reading the
3-Ibid., 22$.
2Ibid., 226.
3J„ M. Brown, "Hobbes t A Rejoinder," Political
Studies, 11(1954) . 166-172,
“
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book.

Brown then proceeds to reiterate his interpretation

of Hobbes’s concept of obligation and of the institution
of: the political -covenant.^
Moreover, Brown contends that Krook has misrepre
sented his view of the last two books of the Leviathan„
Rather, Brown contends, he still maintains as before that
it is in the twenty-second chapter where Hobbes deals with
the problem of the Scriptures.

This contention, however,

does not say that the Christian Scriptures are not involved
in Hobbes’s construction of the natural laws.
Lastly, Brown views with amazement Krook’s assump
tion that he agrees with Oakeshott’s interpretation of the
definitions of justice and injustice in the civil state.
On top of this, asserts Brown, Krook then proceeds to lec
ture him on nominalism.
The last paragraph of Brown’s article is perhaps
representative of his attitude towards Krook.
The falsification, as compared with
the truthful representation, of the clas
sical political theorists, admittedly re«
quires less time, makes quite as good lit
erature, sets off equally well one’s own
ideas, and facilitates the writing of his
tories of thought: but it remains falsifi
cation.!
The next controversy that will be discussed is
neither so broad nor so acrid.

For in this controversy

it would appear that the opponents hold great respect for

^-Ibid., 172.
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each other as scholars, however, not enough so that they
will accept other’s views instead of their own.

This
\

particular intellectual polemic centers around the inter
pretations of Hobbes’s theory of obligation by Taylor and
Warrender.

The first article, chronologically, in this

debate is by John Plamenatz, a gentleman of the tradi
tional school.'*'

It is Plamenatz's principal contention

that Warrender renders his own thesis untenable by his two
admissionss namely, that the Hobbesian man always acts
from hope of some benefit, or from fear of some hurt to
himself, and that the laws of nature are not obligatory
when considered only by their content, but are binding only
as the commands of a God whose power is irresistible.'
Plamenatz asserts it is possible that Hobbes be
lieved man must first be obligated by the laws of nature as
commands of God before he is required to obey the civil sov
ereign.

It is possible, also, that unless men feared God,

they could never have a sufficient motive for obeying the
sovereign and thus making his power effective.

What

Plamenatz does deny is that Hobbes needed to hold these
views to explain how men can be obligated to obey their
worldly rules, "or how they can have a sufficient motive
2
for such obedience."
It is difficult to discern at this
^-John Plamenatz, "Mr. Warrender’s Hobbes," Politi
cal Studies. V(1957), 295-308.
2Ibid.. 298.
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point whether Plamenatz is criticizing Warrender, or trying
to refute Hobbes within his own system,,

Nevertheless, in

Plamenatz’s opinion, men are said to be constrained when
they stand in such a relation to someone who commands them,
that "if they see that relation clearly, they cannot choose
but do what is commanded of them."'*'

Therefore, where men

are unequal, either physically or mentally, there may be
obligations among them that would not necessarily be con
tingent upon a prior obligation to obey God.

Furthermore,

asserts Plamenatz, Hobbes does not say that power must be
irresistible to justify any action —

he only says that ir

resistible power alone can justify all actions.

This Hob-

besian contention thus nullifies Warrender1s thesis that
only irresistible power alone can justify obligation.

Ac

cording to Plamenatz, we are obligated at all times to obey
God, because his punishments are inescapable, "in the sense
that, whenever we see clearly how we stand in relation to
him, we cannot help but chose to do what he requires of us."2
The fact that some of the punishments of the sovereign can
be avoided, however, does not effect the nature of our ob
ligation to him, only the extent.

This situation in no way

requires that we should be previously bound to obey God be
fore we can be obliged to obey the sovereign.

All that is

needed, asserts Plamenatz, if there is to be obligation as
1Ibid., 297o
2Ibid.. 299o
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Hobbes understood it,
is that there should be commands issued
by someone so powerful that those who are
called upon to obey stand to gain more than
they lose by doing what he requires of them.
There is a sufficient motives then, to set up political
obligation, even in a godless world, for as soon as the agreement is made and the ruler chosen, it becomes the in
terest of most men to support him most of the time in what
he does.

A majority of the subjects will endorse the sov

ereign's sanctions upon the few subjects who disobey.
Another fault which Plamenatz finds in the argument
of Warrender is that if we must do what God commands because
his power is irresistible, why is his third law of nature
conditional?

That is, God commands us to keep our covenants

only if other parties have already kept them, or we have ad2
equate grounds for believing that they will do so.
This
qualification, asserts Plamenatz, means that we must al
ready have an adequate motive for keeping the covenant
which establishes the sovereign, and that the command of
God for us to obey it is only secondary.

The need for se

curity is the motive which explains obedience, even in a
godless world of selfish men without hope of a life after
death.

According to Plamenatz, then, the fear of God can

only add a further motive to one which is already sufficient
1Ibid.
2Ibid., 3.00.

without that fear.

’’Once again, God is superfluous.”1

Another confusing point for Plamenatz is Hobbes’s
emphasis on God, that is, if the only thing we can know of
him is his existence, for his nature is incomprehensible to
us.

Furthermore, it is only through revelation that we know

there is a life after death, and the sovereign must tell us
what revelation to believe.

This presents a very perplexing

problem to Plamenatz, as is easily illustrated in this para
graph :
Thus it is on. the sovereign’s authority
that we receive the belief without which we
have no motive for fearing God...lit'is on the
sovereign authority that we receive the doctrine without which it could not be our duty
to keep the covenant to obey the sovereign.2
In the next place, Plamenatz does not see why Warrender, in the light of his main thesis, includes the cov
enant in Hobbes’s political philosophy.

For, as Plamenatz

asserts,
if all Hobbes wanted to do was to show
that no ruler can have power unless at least ;
some of his subjects obey him from other mo-?
tives than from being punished by him, he had
no need to resort to a covenant to make his
point. On the other hand (and this is more
likely) if what he wanted was to show that
all rightful obedience of man to man rests
on covenant, he attempted the impossible
Here again it would seem that Plamenatz is attempting to
^T b i d ., 3D1.
2Ibid.. 303.
^Ibid.
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prove Hobbes wrong, while using Warrender as an opponent.
In conclusion, Plamenatz disagrees with Warrender’s
definition of natural right, i.e., a freedom from obligation
to renounce a right.

For Plamenatz, natural right is merely

the absence of obligation.

This leads to his disagreement

with Warrender’s contention that a subject is not responsible
for the action of the sovereign, even though he authorizes
his action.

According to Plamenatz, Hobbes says again and

again that the sovereign cannot injure his subjects because
they are the author of all his sovereign acts.

Hobbes means

that they are, is some sense or other, responsible for what
the sovereign does.
Warrender wrote a rebuttal to Plamenatz’s article,
but it will not be examined until two other arguments con
cerning the same subject have been discussed.
The second scholar who takes issue with Warrender
is Thomas Nagel, of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

Al

though Nagel is doubtlessly an astute scholar, his article
suffers from obscurities and complexities.

In his article

Nagel attempts to show that genuine moral obligation plays
no part in the Leviathan at all, ’’but that what Hobbes calls
moral obligation is based exclusively on considerations of
rational self-interest.”^

Nagel feels that an egotistic

theory of motivation permeates the whole book.

This theory

-^•Thomas Nagel, ’’Hobbes Concept of Obligation,”
Philosophical Review, LXVII(1959), 68-83 «>
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is brought out with particular clarity in Hobbes’s laws of
naturei,i his explanation of why certain rights are inalien
able, and his stipulation about what sort of covenants the
Hobbesian man can or cannot be conceived to have made.
According to Nagel, there are in Warrender’s ac
count two separate systems: a theory of motivation, and a
theory of obligation.

The first has self-preservation as

its supreme principle, based upon the fact that all men
will regard death as the greatest evil; whereas the second
is based upon the duty to obey natural law as the will of
God.2
Nagel, however, takes a disapproving view of the
above thesis and accordingly attempts to refute them.
For Warrender, asserts Nagel, the reason.a person can do
his duty is because he is able to see it as a means to
his self-preservation, but the reason he ought to do it
is because God commands it.

Self-preservation is the re

quisite condition and not the ground of legal and moral
obligation.

Any law to bind must satisfy certain demands

of the one upon whom it is binding.

Nagel goes so far as

to endorse a concept of validating conditions, but he dif
fers from Warrender in regard to the source of these, ob
ligations.

According to Nagel, Warrender maintains that

%agel,

op. cit., 69-70.

2Ibid., 7 0 .
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a person must be capable of.having an
adequate motive to obey the law (which he
claims is involved in the notion that ought
implies can), plus the empirical fact that
since men perform only those actions which
they believe to be in their own self-inter
est, only in rare circumstances ean anyone
have an adequate motive to contribute to
his own destruction or not to resist others
in attempts on his life. All obligatory
actions must be at least capable of being
regarded by the individual concerned as in
his best personal interest; therefore selfdestruction and the like are never obligatory.
This, according to Nagel, is Warrender*s method of denying
that self-interest is the ground of Hobbes’s theory of
obligation.

Frankly, this is a rather confusing assertion.

On the other hand, Nagel believes that the Hobbesian man can never perform any action unless he believes
it to be in his own self-interest, i.e., all actions must,
be immediately perceived as conducive to self-interest.
The Hobbesian man is susceptible only to selfish motiva
tion, and therefore can not perform any action that could
be labeled moral.

Warrender’s own admission, contends

Nagel, that the Hobbesian man can never act voluntarily
without having as an object his own personal good, is the
downfall of any attempt to put0 a moral construction on
Hobbes’s concept of obligation.

Nothing may be called a

moral obligation which in principle never conflicts with
self-interest.

A person so motivated could never have a

1I-bid. , 73.
2Ibid., 74.

39
feeling of genuine moral duty.
Nagel also takes issue with Warrender*s proposition
that the laws of nature are obligatory only as the commands
of God.

Nowhere, asserts Nagel, does Hobbes say that only

the commands of an authority can be obligatory ■—

all he

says is that the commands of an authority are laws.

Ac

cordingly, Nagel denies that natural laws derive their bind
ing status because they proceed from God.

For him Hobbes’s

primary ground of obligation is prudential, with even the
obligation to obey God being grounded on sagacity!*

This

critic bases his conclusions on Hobbes’s afterthought to
his laws of nature where, he ’’says that his calling of these
precepts ’laws’ is not strictly correct, since only the
commands of an authority are properly called laws.”-*- Ac
cording to Nagel, the role of God in the Hobbesian system
is manifold.

Firstly, He is the omnipotent ruler of his

natural kingdom, His subjects being those who.believe He
exists and governs.

Secondly, He functions as the cause

of all things, all m e n ’s passions, desires, and appetites
being caused by God’s will.

2

Lastly, and negatively, He

is not the basis of moral obligation, for the ..laws of na
ture are obligatory in themselves.

They may derive some

moral obligation as being the commands of God, but these
are not their general grounds.
1Ibid., 7 6 .
2Ibid., 7 9 .

Furthermore, contends
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Nagel, a system of obligation which has at its apex the
authority of a person, and not a principle, could never
properly be called a moral system„

For morality in a true

sense is not a product of sovereign fiat.

In the last ana

lysis Nagel endorses the following position;
It is a mistake to say that God is the
ultimate appeal for Hobbes, for, if that
were so, then all things which He ordered
would be of equal obligatoriness, and when
ever He changed his orders, our obligations
would change.
The essentials of Hobbes’s
system are a set of principles concerned
mainly with the preservation of human so
ciety, and if those principles were changed,
it would not be the same system.^
The third major attemot to refute the Taylor thep
sis is made by S. M. Brown, Jr., of Cornell University.
This critic is rather dismayed at the acceptance of the
Taylor thesis by contemporary scholars.

He states that the

controversies about the interpretation of Hobbes’s theory
have been for the most part between scholars who completely
endorse the Taylor thesis and those who disagree only as to
what in detail Hobbes’s non-prudential theory of obligation

-k[bid., 80.
^S. M. Brown, Jr., ’’Hobbes; The Taylor Thesis,” Phil'osophical Review, LXVIII(1959), 303-323. Stuart M. Brown, Jr.,
a professor of philosophy at Cornell University„ was born in
1914. He received his Bachelor of Science and his Doctor
of Philosophy degrees from Cornell University.
Brown cur
rently instructs in the fields of ethics and political the
ory. Also during his career he has written several articles.
Directory of American Scholars. 3rd ed., 1957, 96.
■3
"a. M. Brown, Jr., op. cit.„ 304.
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Strangely enough, Brown places Oakeshott in the sec
ond category, saying that because Oakeshott construes selfinterest as rational obligation he disengages Hobbes1s eth
ical theory proper from his egotistical psychology.

That

is, Oakeshott's rational obligation is an internal and psy
chological phenomenon which supplies no principle for the
authorization of the sovereign.
Brown’s major contention is that the Taylor thesis
is false, for he holds that
Hobbes does not in fact hold and cannot
in principle admit, that the statements com
prising his psychology have no logical bear
ing on the statements compromising his ethi
cal theory. 1
Brown, in attempting to prove the Taylor thesis
false, employs two principal considerations.

In the first

place, he contends, there is Hobbes's own testimony about
what he is doing in his political treatises.

As a political

theory often has practical implications adverse to the in
terests of men, the political philosopher must establish his
major doctrines by vigorous arguments from premises that
2
cannot be denied.
Hobbes follows this procedure, for he
grounds the sovereign's right and both the duty and liberty
of the subjects on the known natural inclinations of man
kind.

Hobbes explicitly denies that his ethical theory is

independent of his psychology.
-klbid., 3 0 7 .
2Ibid.. 30B.

Consequently, contends
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Brown, the Taylor thesis, as an account of Hobbes in terras
of what Hobbes thinks and is trying to accomplish, is false!

1

The proponents of the Taylor thesis in fact disregard Hobbes’s
logical standards, and interpret his doctrine as if such stan
dards were irrelevant.

According to Brown, the attempt to

piece together a logically independent doctrine out of Hobbes’s theory is to emasculate him.

2

.

What Hobbes demands

for a political theory is logical .support for moral and po
litical doctrines which would otherwise remain unestablished
andcontroversial;
as his

’’and what the

Taylor thesis has presented

theory is a set of doctrines which, lacking the re

quired support, cannot constitute the theory.”3

Both Oake

shott and Warrender appear to suppose that Hobbes’s thought
is too lacking in clarity, precision, and vigor to be a.sysr
tematic theory of the kind Hobbes himself thinks he is pre
senting.

But any interpretation based upon such a supposi

tion is absurd, asserts Brown,
for if Hobbes thought is so loose to
justify ignoring what he presents as his
theory, it is absurd for a commentator:to
expound as Hobbes’s real theory a set of
doctrines which satisfy strict taste of
clarity and consistency.4
Brown concludes this first argument with the contention that
1Ibid.
2Ib id ,. 3 0 4 .
3Ibid.

4 bid.. 309.

the Taylor thesis would be valuable as a side of Hobbes’s
theory which the traditional interpretation tends to ignore
i.e,s it could be employed to portray Hobbes as a man whose
own moral and political convictions were not at every point
compatible with the logical implications of his argument.
Brown’s second consideration is that the moral.doc
trine (Taylor thesis), pieced together out of Hobbes and
expounded sympathetically as a self-consistent theory, is
in fact inconsistent and philosophically untenable.

The

proponents of the Taylor thesis must present a theory in
which the concept of obligation is moral, as distinct from
prudential, or legal, and in which psychological factors
are not considered.

Brown contends that this is impossible

for in Hobbes’s doctrine the notion of the covenant is em
ployed as the indispensible logical connection between po
litical obligation and psychological considerations.

It

is used to link the obligation to obey the law with those
human desires and aversions which give every citizen a
stake in the institution of government.

The duties of

citizenship presuppose an obligation conceived in terms
of the covenant, and covenanting presupposes interests at
stake.

Brown asserts?
In the Taylor thesis, the chain of
presuppositions must be broken at the
point where the moral considerations
will be. together completely isolated
from considerations of interest expli
cated in psychological terms.1
^Ibid.. 311 o

This inconsistency, contends Brown, manifests itself in
Oakeshott’s interpretation as a flat contradiction.

At

first the latter’s explanation of why the subjects should
obey the sovereign is stated in terms of covenanting and
is moral, i.e., the subjects authorize the sovereign by
their own acts.

In the next sentence, however, the moral

explanation is contradicted and restated in terms of pos
itive law, i.e., the covenant itself is not morally ob
ligatory because it is not a law.

The covenant is not

the will of the sovereign and so it does not itself make
any conduct morally obligatory.

According to Brown, then*

Oakeshott1s account is in the end legal, although he tries
to make it moral.
Taylor’s difficulty is somewhat similar, as he
begins by asserting that a man is obligated to be a good
citizen because he has pledged himself in the covenant to
be one, but then proceeds to argue that all obligation,
including that of honoring covenants, is derived from the
laws of nature as being the commands of God.

Here again,

says Brown, is a contradictions
I am obliged because I have covenanted;
but as there would be no obligation to keep
covenants unless some authority, God or
civil sovereign, commands it, covenants of
themselves do not oblige.•*Warrender, asserts Brown, avoids this contradic-
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tion by never giving Hobbes’s account of obligation solely
in terms of a covenant or pledge.

This position, however,

attributes an absurdity to Hobbes; for natural law, as the
command of God, does not guarantee performance, it only
guarantees the obligation to perform.

Furthermore, con

tends Brown, Warrender’s distinction between atheists and
theists, with respect to obligation, attributes no in
trinsic moral content to natural law.

Law in itself im

poses no obligation, for if it did the atheist would be
constrained, and it would not be necessary to provide a
guarantee of the obligatory character of covenants.

Ac

cording to Brown, it follows from this that no one is ob
liged.
For to say that natural law is the
command of God is simply to say that a
set of rules, lacking in moral content.,
is law in the strict sense. If an athe
ist cannot incur an obligation to obey
civil law, simply by acknowledging the
status of the civil sovereign, then
neither I nor anybody can incur an ob
ligation to obey natural law simply by
acknowledging the status of God as sov
ereign in a kingdom of nature. What
Warrender attributes to Hobbes as a the
ory of obligation is a position in which
no one can be obliged at all,4
For Brown, then, the Taylor thesis is false.

It

creates new difficulties for Hobbes based on mistakes he
did not make.

Moreover, Hobbes did not ask the two dis

tinct questions;

why ought I to do my duty, and how is

^Ibid,. 314*
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it psychologically possible for me to do it?

This separa

tion, contends Brown, implies that Hobbes wanted to make
a distinction between moral and prudential questions, where
as, in fact, he combines the two.

The question before

Hobbes is one in moral and civil prudence, i.e., how to
establish unconditional submission to the civil state..
Brown concludes by saying that there is no justi
fication for the view, advanced by Taylor and others, that
natural laws are to be interpreted in either of two logi
cally distinct ways: either as prudential maxims which im
ply no obligations, or as commands of God which are ob
ligatory.

Hobbes’s psychology does not consist primarily

of empirical statements, but bather of logical'statements,
which justify the presumption of logically necessary con
nections.

Hence, statements like "Men necessarily desire

their own good” are logical.

The laws of nature, then,

cannot be related to Hobbes’s egotism as prudential maxims.
The following paragraph characterizes Brown's position:
Hobbes psychology is indispensible
because in it he establishes the sense
of good in terms of which he argues that
the stake of each man in the institution
of government is of supreme magnitude.
What is completely dispensible in Hobbes
are prudential maxims and the commands,
of God. The Taylor thesis grossly mis
represents Hobbes’s because it dispenses
with the indispensible and makes what is ^
dispensible the very heart of his theory.
So concludes what isvperhaps the most refined crit-

1I M d . , 323.
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icism of the Taylor thesis.

But the controversy was not

yet over, for Warrender has written a counter-rebuttal to
Plamenatz, and he also has expressed his intention to an
swer his other critics.
In the first place, Warrender feels that it is not
always clear just how far Plamenatz disagrees with him,
and just how far with Hobbes.

Secondly., Warrender contends

that Plamenatz puts too much emphasis on the place of God
in Warrender’s interpretation.

In support of this second

contention, Warrender asserts that 3 s far as parts one and
two of his book are concerned, the place of God is not in
volved, and any such references are only incidental to the
argument.

Parts one and two are concerned with piecing to

gether the pattern of obligation, the conclusion being that
everything is dependent upon the obligation to obey natural
law.

Provided this pattern has some prescriptive meaning,

it holds good for Hobbes’s definition of obligation.

Fur

thermore, he says in part one, whichiis.concerned! with the
question of what kind of obligation is evoked, that God is
not an integral factor.

Im-,this section Warrender sets

forth three alternative solutions about what the remainder
of Hobbes’s theory of obligation is based upon;
(i) divine rewards and punishments,
(ii) simply upon the will of God,
^Howard Warrender, ’’The Place of God in Hobbes Phil
osophy; a Reply to Mr. Plamenatz,” Political Studies, VIII
(I960), 46-57.
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(iii) a body of natural law having selfevident. or intrinsic authority,,!
According to Warrender, the first alternative seems
to be the most likely for Hobbes, even though he himself
would have preferred that Hobbes use the third one.

In any

event, all these solutions vary only within a narrow range
—

they all result in some special status being given to

natural law.

Immediate status is given if natural law has

intrinsic authority; and indirect status, if it is God’s
unchangeable command.
upon natural law.

Consequently the whole system hangs

Thus, if God were to be removed from

Hobbes’s political doctrine, the thesis of Warrender’s book
would not really be affected.
Thirdly,.Warrender asserts that, according to
Plamenatz, God is superfluous in Hobbes’s system, on the
grounds that Hobbes could have solved both the problem of
political obligation and that of the motive for obedience
by having civil government based on ordinary self-interest
alone.

Ordinary self-interest would eliminate not only

God, but also the laws of nature as Warrender conceives
them. 2
Apparently Pldmenatz and Warrender start from dif
ferent definitions'of Hobbes’s theory of obligation.

Ob

ligation,1> for Plamenatz, is derived from a sanction that is
Ibid., 44.
2Ibid. i 5 0 ..
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sufficient if clearly apprehended.

This sanction would

operate on men permanently, provided they have due know
ledge and reflection.

Warrender holds that because only

God exercises such a sanction, his is the only power that
can produce obligation.-*- Moreover,, the ease where a per
son exercises a sanction over another person is not obli
gation per_se, but simply ’’power.”
ter is the instrument of subjection.

The power of the mas
In any event, con

tends Warrender, the situation where one has power over
any other is impermanent in time, and does not necessarily
bind other parties.

Brute force requires something extra

to produce genuine permanent obligation.

Warrender ad

mits that there is an analogy in Hobbes’s doctrine be
tween God’s power and m a n’s power, which leads us to be
lieve that there is nothing special about God’s power ex
cept for its efficiency and amount.

It is this same anal

ogy, asserts Warrender, that underlies Plamenatz’s attempts
to refute Hobbes within his own system.

Warrender main

tains, however, that the analogy is misleading, and fur
thermore Hobbes does not follow it.

The power of God dif

fers from that of men in kind, not degree.

God’s power is

unknown and directed to support a rational body of princi
ples -- the laws of nature; whereas the power of man is as
sociated with visible signs and directed to serve the ends
that the wielder of the power has set for himself.
-^Ibido

The
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analogy is conceivably valid in the prophetic kingdom,
where God has a personal relationship to His subjects,
but certainly not in the natural kingdom -- the world. In
His natural kingdom the power of God is introduced as a
formal answer —

government in this kingdom being based on

rational knowledge, with the limitations of reason to set
its boundaries.

The laws of nature are discerned through

reason, and reason tells us very little more than this ex
cept the necessity of some hypothesis to account for their
formal statues.

This hypothesis can be filled in accord

ing to the individual’s belief and religion.

A related

point, asserts Warrender, is that for Hobbes, no obliga
tion arises between the conqueror and the vanquished un
less a covenant is made in which the defeated have prom
ised obedience in return for their lives.

Without such a

covenant the conquered may act as they wish, subject only
to physical restraint.

Regardless, Hobbes thought that

temporary leaders were inherently unstable, and thus could
not form any firm basis for the establishment of the state.
Warrender also takes issue with. Plamenatz’s con
tention that ordinary self-interest is enough to maintain
the state, for he feels that at times there may be a dis
crepancy between selfish interest and public interest.

If

such a discrepancy arises, an ample amount of state coer
cive power would be difficult to achieve.

Warrender points

out that insurrections are often profitable.

101
According to this critic, then, Hobbes’s theory
needs a source of obligation strong enough to bind the sub
ject to the degree of suicidal risk.

This cannot derive

from the ordinary principle of self-interest; it can only
come from the obligation to obey natural law.

Personal

self-interest is not what makes certain acts obligatory,
but rather is what suspends the obligation to do certain
actions that would otherwise be obligatory.

Moreover,

the laws of nature are not strictly for personal preserva
tion, rather they are rules for the preservation of men in
general.

To ’’preserve yourself” is not the formula re

quired for the. :institution of the state, but rather ’’that
all men can be preserved,” except where it is inconsistent
with one’s own preservation,

A formula of this kind could

never have its origin in ordinary self-interest,
Warrender agrees with Plamenatz that the third law
of nature is conditional.

However, he feels that this is

still compatible with his interpretation of Hobbes’s theory
of obligation.

The individual is not obligated to do any

thing he honestly believes to be suicidal, but short of
this he remains obligated to do his best,

Warrender feels

that if God is to be regarded as the author of moral laws,
it is no more absurd for him to command a conditional pre
cept, than it is to have a human system of conditional
moral principles,^

-kibid,„• 56,
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Finally, Warrender does not agree with Plamenatz’s
contention that we have to accept the sovereign’s interpre
tation of the Scriptures in order to know God and his punish
ments.

He feels that this conclusion is unfair to Hobbes,

for in Hobbes’s doctrine political obligation depends ulti
mately on the laws of nature, which are known to all men
by the use of reason, regardless of their political beliefs
A

or religion.

Furthermore, the sovereign’s interpretation

does not affect man’s inner beliefs, which depend on God’s
grace.

Warrender summarizes his ideas in the following para

graph :
As Hobbes makes clear, the basic ob
ligation to keep the political covenant
is prior to anything that the sovereign
decrees; otherwise there would be no need
to take notice of what the sovereign had
ordered, including, of course, his views
on works of prophecy. Nothing essential,
therefore, depends upon the sovereign’s
interpretations.1
One other article, written by a man who has not ac
tually been involved in the controversy himself, deserves
to be discussed before this chapter is brought to a close.
This article, written by Willis B. Glover of Mercer Uni
versity, is concerned with Hobbes’s concept of God and the
role He plays in Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy.2
1Ibid.
% . B. Glover, ”God and Thomas Hobbes,” Church' His
tory, - m x ( 1 9 6 0 ) . 275-297. Willis Border Glover, a professor
of history at Mercer University, was born in 1915. He re
ceived his higher education from Mississippi College, the
University of Virginia, and Harvard University. Currently he
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It is Glover’s contention that Hobbes is not an atheist.
According to this author:, if one takes at face Value what
Hobbes says about religion, "the set of opinions which emerge is a combination of reformation theology with the
discursive rationalism that was to characterize the eight
eenth century...”'*' Hobbes conceives of a God who acts
directly in nature and history, who is the source of right
eousness, but is not in himself bound by any law of moral2
ity.
Furthermore, Hobbes’s insists on the corporeality of
God, but he does not deny that God is a spirit;
...he simply insisted that such spirits
that exist are corporeal. Because he con
ceived God to be a body, Hobbes had no par
ticular difficulty with the idea of His prov
idential activity. Bodies can move other
bodies, and God, the cause of all causes,
still operates directly on other bodies in
accordance with his eternal purpose and
foreknowledge of all things. Since the
substance ./of. God was not like any other
substance, Hobbes was able to avoid con
tradicting at the point the inherited
Christian conception of God as radically
discontinuous with the created world.>
The attack on Hobbes by his contemporaries, contends Glover, was not concerned with specific items in his
theology, but rather with the question of atheism.

In clas-

he teaches modern intellectual history.
During his career
he has published one book on religion, entitled The Evangel
ical Non-conformists and Higher Criticism in the Nineteenth
Century. Directory of American Scholars; 3rd ed., 1957, 275.
■^Glover, op. cit., 276.
2Ibid.

3ibid.. 277.
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sical philosophy materialism was associated with atheism,
and consequently Hobbes, regardless of what he said to the
contrary, was thought to be an atheist.
practice "atheism by c o n s e q u e n c e A t

Hobbes terms this
this point Glover

criticizes the contemporary interpreters who assume that
the seventeenth-century attitudes associated with some of
Hobbes's ideas must be the real attitude of Hobbes.

The

author points out that those who consider Hobbes an atheist
"are forced to assume that he did not mean what he said on
2
religion, and he said a great deal."
Nearly anyone can be
accused of being an atheist on the assumption that whatever
he may have said to the contrary was not seriously meant ^
This method, contends Glover, has often caused serious mis
understandings of Hobbes’s political philosophy.

Three

explanations have been given as to why Hobbes, although an
atheist, should have written as he did;
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

He aimed to destroy Christianity and
the Bible by an elaborate reducto ad
absurdum.
He cluttered his works with theistic
suggestions and pronouncements in or
der to protect himself from persecu
tion for the atheistic basis of his
politics and mechanics.
He sought to support his political
views by the appeal to the beliefs
of his readers.

•kEbid.. 27$.
2Ibid.. 2 7 9 .
3Ibid.

^Ibid.
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On examining the above motives, contends Glover,
one finds that they are either mutually inconsistent or im
plausible.

The first motive is not consistent with the other

two, and while it is conceivable that the second and third
motives do not contradict each other, they are both im
plausible.

Glover criticizes the contemporary savants, who.

realizing that religious pretense cannot
be proved against Hobbes, and yet unable to
free themselves from the traditional concep
tion of Hobbes the atheist, have found his
political writings so confusing that they con
clude Hobbes must have been himself confused
to have introduced God into his political
philosophy at all.^
Glover singles out Plamenatz in particular.

According to

Glover, it is more plausible to assume that Hobbes believed
in God, and that he wrote his political philosophy accord
ingly.
Furthermore, Glover argues that the problem of church
and state is more crucial to Hobbes than most of his interpretators have recognized.

It has been assumed that his

,

state is entirely secular, and religion is a mere instrument
of the sovereign.

This is not. the case, contends Glover, for

far from making religion a tool of the state, "Hobbes defines
the Christian state as a ehurch and ascribes to it a religious
mission which takes precedence over its legitimate worldly
concerns."

2

Religion furnishes the limiting context within

XIbid.. 280.

2Ibid.. 281.
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which the sovereign can fulfill the ends of government and
secure the-maximum development of his power.
uous obedience to natural laws.

1

The contin

He is also subject to the

law, however, and can succeed as sovereign only by obedience
to those natural laws which are the conditions for the ex
istence of the society he rules.

Also, Glover believes,

one of the sovereign’s prime d:uties is to insure the sal
vation of his subjects.

He points to the fact that the

subject is not constrained when his eternal salvation is
in jeopardy.

Hobbes’s concern with the relationship of the

state to Christianity and the difficulties involved make
untenable any thesis that his religious expressions are in
sincere or irrelevant.
In the end, Glover agrees with Taylor that Hobbes’s
ethical system is basically deontological —

God’s command

being the source of obligation.
The article by Glover thus concludes this analysis
of the contemporary polemics concerning the political phil
osophy of Hobbes.

The variety of interpretations perhaps

staggers the imagination of the student of Hobbes and in
the end serve only to confuse him, for each of the inter
pretations has some basis.

Moreover, it is highly doubtful

that a clear synthesis could ever be had from the above
views; and even at best, a synthesis would only be an ap
proximation of what Hobbes really meant.
^I bid., 282o

CONCLUSION
Hobbes apparently anticipated a certain amount of
confusion concerning the meaning of his theories, and to
provide for this he wrote meticulously, even to the point
of setting forth a list of definitions.

It would appear,

however, that Hobbes judged his prospective readers rather
poorly for, if he were resurrected, he might view with
amazement the disagreement among contemporary scholars
regarding the actual meaning of his political philosophy.
He would perhaps endorse the contention that he was the au
thor of a profoundly skeptical doctrine which finds the on
ly solution to man’s predicament in force and coercion,
but he might be astonished to discover himself being clas
sified as a Kantian deontologist.

In fact, it is highly

probable that, if he attempted to explain his real intent,
a few scholars would still disagree with him.
Resurrection, however, in this temporal world, is
not possible, and so the real meaning of Hobbes’s political
philosophy is forever obscured by the passage of time.
Therefore, we can only be content with an approximation of
it, by hoping that Hobbes wrote what he actually believed.
There is an impediment here, however, for Hobbes’s works
are for the most part written in a seventeenth-century
frame of mind.

Also, even if we understand the seventeenth-
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century contexts Hobbes has often given new and unusual
meanings to the words he employs.

Furthermore, we cannot

rely too much on the views of Hobbes’s contemporary crit
ics s for it is possible that their opinions were controlled
more by indignation than by analysis.

Any plausible inter

pretation, then, must take into account manifold factors.
We have been concerned with the areas of disagree
ment among the contemporary students of Hobbes.

Their

multiplicity only shows that virtually any meaning can be
read into a theorist by utilizing certain parts of his
works and disregarding others.

Before these disagreements

are commented on, however, a few prefatory remarks are in
order.
It must be remembered that Hobbes wrote in a timeof crisis, a crisis in.-which both the civil and religious
orders were being subjected to violent upheavals.

His ma

jor work, the Leviathan, was composed while he was a vol
untary exile in Paris.

In fact, this very book appeared in

London at a critical juncture in Cromwell’s career, when,
after his victory over the royalists at Worcester, he was
strong enough to defy the Rump Parliament and usher in the
Protectorate.
So out of a life intertwined with crisis after
crisis came Hobbes’s major religious and political con
ceptions.

In Hobbes's mind the dread of war was the one

irrefutable objection to civil reform.

Among all of man’s
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demoniacal practices war was the worst; it was the supreme
evil that levelled to the ground all of men’s accomplishments and aspirations0

For Hobbes conflict as such was not

limited to the civil sphere, since no force was more dy
namically destructive to the peace of the kingdom than
religious controversy -- the endless sectarian disputes
arising from the different interpretations of the Scrip
tures.,
To Hobbes, the summum bonum in a civil state was
peace and tranquility.

Here, then, was Hobbes’s fundamen

tal problems how to h-ave a state that would provide order
and security in both the civil and religious spheres.
The present disputations divide themselves into
several major areas.

The first centers around the Hobbes-

ian theory of moral and political obligation.

The tradi

tional interpretation appears to be the most plausible of
those advanced, i.e., obligation derives from prudential
self-interesto

According to this explication, if there is

a theory of moral obligation in Hobbes’s doctrine, it must
be explained in terms of self-interest.

The argument that

Hobbes’s ethical theory is a deontology, a moral obligation
arising from a source other than society, is permeated "with
\

inconsistencies and untenable assumptions, as has already
been pointed out.

The existence of a transcendent moral

code has always been seriously questioned, and when one
■^Plamenatz, Nagel, and S. M. Brown, Jr., advance
this very contention.
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considers the characteristics of the Hobbesian man:'.in a
state of natures it is difficult to concede any type of
moral obligation to him at alio

Warrender’s own admis

sion that the Hobbesian man always acts from the hope of
some benefit or fear of some hurt to himself, makes the
Taylor-Warrender thesis unsound#

The Hobbesian man can

never perform any action unless he believes it to be in
his own self-interest, i.e., he is susceptible only to
selfish motivation0

It is difficult to see how an egotis

tical theory of motivation could be construed as a deon
tology#

Furthermore5 if Hobbes contends that the only

thing which we can know about God is that He is the first
cause of things, how can we know that He is the author of
a set of moral laws#

For example s there is Hobbes’s para

graph concerning what man knows about God#
So that it is impossible to make any
profound inquiry into natural causes, with
out being inclined thereby to believe there
is one God eternal; though they cannot have
any idea of him in their mi nd s answerable to
their nature# For as a man that is born
blind8 hearing men talk of warming themselves
by the fire8 and being brought .to warm .him
self 8 by the same,, may easily conceive, and
assure himself, there is somewhat there,
which men call fire. and is the cause of the
heat he feels; but cannot imagine what it is
like; nor have any idea of it in his mind,
such as they have that see it; so also by ••
the visible things in the world, and their
admirable order,, a man may conceive there
is a cause of them, which men call God; and
yet not have an idea, or image of him in his
mind#l
Thomas Hobbes^: Leviathan# ed# Michael Oakeshott
(Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1946), o9#

Ill
Moral' laws to be obligatory must be the command
of some one whose precept contains in it the reason of
obedience.

Therefore, if man cannot have an image or idea

of God in his mind, how can he be constrained to obey His
moral laws?

In the state of nature where man is concerned

with his immediate struggle for existence, the most he
will do is to pay lip-service to an entity that he can
neither conceive nor understand,.
Even in the civil state there is no obligation to
obey God unless the sovereign wills it„

It seems rather

ridiculous that the sovereign would have to command ob
edience to God if there is already a prior obligation to
obey Him.

One ultimately realizes that without the sover

eign’s command there would be no obligation to obey God,
and hence the sovereign must constitute the source of au
thority.
It is far more plausible to assume that in Hobbes’s
state of nature there is no obligation, except that of
pursuing one’s own self-interest.

Furthermore, prudential

self-interest furnishes a sufficient motive for continued
obedience to the commands of the sovereign.
A second major area of disagreement revolves around
the question of whether Hobbes was or was not an atheist.
This is a rather difficult question to answer, but it is
quite clear that Hobbes’s system, like any other mater
ialistic system, is incompatible with theism.

As stated
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above, Hobbes, when he did admit of a God, considered him
only as the first cause, and as such incomprehensible.
However, it is certain that if he meant what he said about
religion, he cannot be called a Calvinist or a member of
any other denomination.

Any man who condemns religion as

a parasite on fear does not endorse any seventeenth-cen
tury creed.

For Hobbes, the natural seed of religion con

sists of four things; opinions of ghosts; ignorance of sec
ond causes; devotion to that which men fear; and the taking
of things causal for p r o g n o s t i c s M o r e o v e r , he contends
that these things by reason of different fancies, judgments,
and passions of men have grown up into ceremonies so dif
ferent, that those which are used by one man, are for the
most part ridiculous to another.

Whether Hobbes is talking

about theology with tongue in cheek is hard to discern, but
one does not usually write this way and still retain a sin
cere belief in religion.
A third area of controversy is concerned with the
status of the Hobbesian laws of nature.

One school of in

terpretation contends that they are the commands of God,
and therefore morally binding; whereas another school be
lieves them to be general rules of reason for man’s selfpreservation, and as such not morally obligatory.

The lat

ter view appears to be the more specious when one considers
Hobbes’s own definition of a law of nature;

-*-Ibid., 72 .
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A law of nature, lex naturalis. is a pre
cept or general rule, found out by reason,
which man is forbidden to do that, which is
destructive of his life, or taketh away the
means of preserving the same; and to admit
that, by which he thinketh it may be best
preservedol
Furthermore, it is difficult to construe the whole of Hob
bes’s first law of nature as being the command of God.
Conceivably, the first part could be a divine command, i.e.,
every man ought to endeavor peace and maintain it.

How

ever, certainly the second part is not a sacred law, which
states ,that when men cannot obtain peace they may seek and
use all the helps and advantages of war for their selfpreservation.

2

At the present time there seems to be little hope
that the intellectual disputations over the political phil
osophy of Hobbes will be resolved.

In fact, it is highly

doubtful that they could ever be resolved, scholarly po-'
lemics being what they are.

In any event, the u n d e r g r a d 

uate will still go on being instructed by the text^book
writers, and Thomas Hobbes will continue to live in infamy.
^Ibid., 34«
2Ibid.. 3 5 o
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